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Article 
The Presumption of Patentability 
Sean B. Seymore†
 
 
[P]resumptions . . . are the mere artificial creatures of law, depending 
entirely on considerations of legal policy and convenience . . . .1
  INTRODUCTION   
 
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (Patent Office) has 
come under fire for issuing patents of questionable quality.2
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of Notre Dame, 2006; Ph.D. (Chemistry), University of Notre Dame, 2001; 
M.S.Chem., Georgia Institute of Technology, 1996; B.S., University of Tennes-
see, 1993. I thank Michael Abramowicz, Daniel Gervais, Timothy Holbrook, 
Lee Petherbridge, Sarah Rajec, John Whealan, and the participants in the 
George Washington University Law School Intellectual Property Speakers Se-
ries for their comments and criticisms on earlier drafts of this Article. I also 
thank Vanderbilt University Law School and the Arnold and Mabel Beckman 
Center at the Chemical Heritage Foundation for providing research grants to 
support this project. Copyright © 2013 by Sean B. Seymore.  
  
Patent quality can be defined as “the capacity of a granted pat-
ent to meet (or exceed) the statutory standards of patentabil-
ity—most importantly, to [cover inventions which are] novel, 
 1. 3 THOMAS STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, 
AND DIGEST OF PROOFS, IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 1225–26 (Lon-
don, J. & W. T. Clarke 1824). 
 2. See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DIS-
CONTENTS 74 (2004) (describing what can happen when the Patent Office 
“falls down on the job”); Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why “Bad” Patents 
Survive in the Market and How Should We Change?—The Private and Social 
Costs of Patents, 55 EMORY L.J. 61, 61–76 (2006) (exploring criticisms); Mark 
A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY 
L.J. 181, 181–82 (2008) (same); Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: 
Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 
689 (2004) (“The Patent Office . . . appears to grant many patents that, when 
carefully scrutinized, fail to meet basic patentability standards.”); John R. 
Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for 
Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 316–22 [hereinafter Thomas, Collu-
sion] (exploring the patent quality crisis). 
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nonobvious, and clearly and sufficiently described.”3 Famous 
examples of questionable patents include one for a motorized 
ice cream cone,4 an umbrella to protect beer cans from sun-
light,5 a method of exercising a cat with a laser pointer,6 and a 
method for sending signals faster than the speed of light.7 
Aside from being technically invalid,8 commentators have ar-
gued that such patents are worthless9 and burdensome on the 
patent system.10
 
 3. R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2135, 2138 (2009); see also JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 
 
2, at 171 
(presenting a similar definition). From an economic perspective, a high-quality 
patent is “one that covers an invention that would not otherwise be made [but 
for the incentive of a patent] or one that ensures that a good idea is commer-
cialized . . . .” Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff, Post-Grant Reviews in the 
U.S. Patent System—Design Choices and Expected Impact, 19 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 989, 991 (2004). The conditions for patentability are found in Title 
35 of the United States Code. In short, the claimed invention must be useful, 
novel, nonobvious, and directed to patentable subject matter. 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 101–103 (2006). In addition, § 112 para. 1 requires that the application ad-
equately describe, enable, and set forth the best mode contemplated for carry-
ing out the invention; and § 112 para. 2 requires that the application conclude 
with claims that delineate the invention with particularity. 35 U.S.C. § 112 
para. 1–2. 
 4. Motorized Ice Cream Cone, U.S. Patent No. 5,971,829 (filed Mar. 6, 
1998). 
 5. Beerbrella, U.S. Patent No. 6,637,447 (filed Oct. 19, 2001). 
 6. Method of Exercising a Cat, U.S. Patent No. 5,443,036 (filed Nov. 2, 
1993). 
 7. Hyper-Light-Speed Antenna, U.S. Patent No. 6,025,810 (filed Oct. 2, 
1997). It is well accepted in science that a signal cannot travel faster than the 
speed of light. See, e.g., ALBERT EINSTEIN & LEOPOLD INFELD, THE EVOLUTION 
OF PHYSICS 149 (1966) (explaining special relativity); Dennis Overbye, Parti-
cles Faster Than the Speed of Light? Not So Fast, Some Say, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
25, 2011, at D3 (noting that despite recent claims to the contrary, physicists 
still agree with Einstein). 
 8. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER 
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 5 (2003) [hereinafter 
FTC REPORT] (“A poor quality or questionable patent is one that is likely inva-
lid or contains claims that are overly broad.”). 
 9. See Edmund W. Kitch, Property Rights in Inventions, Writings, and 
Marks, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 122–23 (1990) (“[M]ost issued patents 
are worthless, or very nearly worthless.”); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six 
Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts 
and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 603 (1999) (“[M]ost 
[patented] technologies will not be economically viable or commercially suc-
cessful . . . .”). 
 10. John R. Thomas, The Responsibility of the Rulemaker: Comparative 
Approaches to Patent Administration Reform, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 727, 
731 (2002) [hereinafter Thomas, Patent Administration Reform] (explaining 
that legal actors must often revisit the Patent Office’s work to assess patent 
validity). 
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The quality problem has been ascribed by different com-
mentators to many different causes. For example, some assert 
that the Patent Office’s current compensation system favors is-
suance over denial11 and rewards throughput over thorough ex-
amination.12 Perhaps most emblematic of this quality-
compromising incentive structure is the Patent Office’s self-
declared mission to “help [its] customers get patents.”13 Others 
argue that examiners lack adequate technical information, 
such as access to the relevant prior art,14 needed to perform a 
rigorous examination.15 And others contend that the Patent Of-
fice’s limited resources16
 
 11. See, e.g., ANTHONY L. MIELE, PATENT STRATEGY 97–98 (2001) (dis-
cussing an examiner’s concerns and incentives); Joseph Farrell & Robert P. 
Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Re-
liably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might 
Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 945 (2004) (arguing that the skewed incen-
tives of the current regime “make it easier and more desirable for examiners to 
grant patents rather than reject them”); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance 
at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1495, 1496 n.3 (2001) [hereinafter 
Lemley, Rational Ignorance] (“[E]xaminers must write up reasons for rejec-
tion, but not reasons for allowance, giving them more incentives to allow ra-
ther than reject an application.”).  
 (which contribute to the well-
 12. See Patrick A. Doody, How to Eliminate the Backlog at the Patent Of-
fice, 37 AIPLA Q.J. 395, 409–18 (2009) (describing examiners’ incentives and 
production goals); Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 11, at 1496 n.3 (de-
scribing the push for examiners to issue patents irrespective of quality). 
 13. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, A PATENT AND TRADEMARK 
OFFICE REVIEW: CREATING A PATENT AND TRADEMARK SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY, FISCAL YEAR 1997, at 8 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
For criticisms, see Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 11, at 1496 n.3 
(“While the job of the PTO is certainly to issue good patents, it is also to reject 
bad ones.”); Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 687, 692–93 (2010) (arguing that this mission sets the stage 
for inadequate screening of patent applications). 
 14. “Prior art” refers to preexisting knowledge and technology already 
available to the public. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (defining the documents and 
activities that can serve as prior art); Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & 
Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citing Graham v. John Deere 
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)). The invention is compared to the prior art in as-
sessing novelty and nonobviousness. See infra notes 160–61. But see Christo-
pher A. Cotropia et al., Do Applicant Patent Citations Matter? Implications for 
the Presumption of Validity 12 (Stanford Law & Econ. Olin, Working Paper 
No. 401, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1656568 (finding through 
an empirical study that “examiners focus almost exclusively on art they find 
themselves [as compared to art provided by the applicant] in considering 
whether a patent application is new and nonobvious”).  
 15. See infra note 285 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra notes 28, 295 and accompanying text. 
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publicized backlog)17 preclude a thorough review of applica-
tions.18
Yet, it would be unfair to cast all of the blame for failings 
in patent examination on the Patent Office. Several commenta-
tors have long argued that the substantive standards of pat-
entability are too low.
  
19 Or, put simply, it is too easy to get a 
(bad) patent.20 This criticism deserves attention because adjust-
ing these standards is considered the principal tool for modu-
lating the scope, frequency, and quality of patents.21 Indeed, 
tightening the standards of patentability has been a major goal 
of judicial efforts at patent reform.22
 
 17. See, e.g., Edward Wyatt, U.S. Sets 21st-Century Goal: Building a Bet-
ter Patent Office, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2011, at A1 (providing backlog statistics 
and partly attributing the recent surge in applications to the Internet age). 
One cause for the backlog is an increase in the number of patent application 
filings over time while the time available for examiners to review applications 
has remained constant. See John L. King, Patent Examination Procedures and 
Patent Quality, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 54, 63 (Wes-
ley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003) (presenting an empirical study). 
 In a series of landmark de-
 18. Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presump-
tion of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 46 (2007). 
 19. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 
162–63 (2008) (exploring the decline in patent quality and attributing the 
weakening of patentability standards to the Federal Circuit); JAFFE & 
LERNER, supra note 2, at 11 (noting that weak novelty and nonobviousness 
standards have led to patents of dubious quality).  
 20. Cf. Adam B. Jaffe, Patent Reform: No Time Like the Present, 4 I/S: J.L. 
& POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 59, 59 (2008) (“Changes in patent law and practice in 
the last two decades have made the system less effective, by making it too easy 
to get patents on trivial and non-original ideas . . . .”); Matthew Sag & Kurt 
Rohde, Patent Reform and Differential Impact, 8 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 15 
(2007) (“One of the most pressing problems in the patent system today is not 
that patents in general are too easy to obtain or too easy to enforce; rather it is 
that bad patents are too easy to obtain and enforce.”). 
 21. See, e.g., DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND 
HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 142 (2009) (using the biotechnology industry 
to demonstrate the benefits of tailored standards). Admittedly, the term “qual-
ity” can be an ambiguous or normatively laden term. This Article uses a con-
sistent definition throughout. See supra text accompanying note 3. 
 22. Patentability standards evolve primarily through judicial rather than 
legislative action. See John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the 
Solicitor General, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 518, 544 (2010) (explaining that pat-
ent law “has traditionally had a common law feel to it” because the courts re-
ceive little guidance from statutory sources); Paul R. Michel, The Challenge 
Ahead: Increasing Predictability in Federal Circuit Jurisprudence for the New 
Century, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1231, 1243–44 (1994) (explaining that the “general” 
nature of the patent statutes requires the Federal Circuit to “unavoidably fill[] 
in gaps and develop[] fine points”); Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the 
Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51, 53 (2010) (noting that the com-
mon law is “the dominant legal force in the development of U.S. patent law”). 
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cisions, reform-minded courts have trimmed the scope of pa-
tent-eligible subject matter,23 made it harder to obtain (and eas-
ier to invalidate) patents based on a lack of nonobviousness,24 
and reinvigorated the requirement that applicants provide an 
adequate disclosure of the invention.25
Thus, it appears that raising the substantive standards of 
patentability could go a long way toward solving the quality 
problem. For instance, if the standards are sufficiently high, an 
applicant would have a decreased likelihood of getting a patent. 
This might deter some persons from filing applications alto-
gether because a robust examination would provide a disincen-
tive for those with low-quality inventions to file.
  
26 Ultimately 
this would reduce the backlog, alleviate the overall strain on 
Patent Office resources, and (combined with various changes 
within the agency)27
 
 23. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010) (holding that claims re-
lating to a method of hedging risks are unpatentable). 
 empower the examiner to conduct an even 
more robust examination of docketed applications. All of this 
 24. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) (rejecting the 
Federal Circuit’s rigid test for nonobviousness due to its inconsistency with 
the “expansive and flexible approach” set forth in Supreme Court precedent). 
 25. See, e.g., ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharms., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 940–41 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (reiterating that an applicant must provide a disclosure which 
enables a person having ordinary skill in the art to practice the full scope of 
the claimed invention without undue experimentation); Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. 
Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351–53 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (reaffirming 
well-settled law that an applicant must provide a disclosure showing posses-
sion of the full scope of the claimed subject matter). 
 26. “To put it crudely, if the [P]atent [O]ffice allows bad patents to issue, 
this encourages people with bad applications to show up.” JAFFE & LERNER, 
supra note 2, at 175. On the other hand, a robust regime does the opposite be-
cause inventors “would understand that [low-quality] applications are a waste 
of time and money.” Id. It is possible that high patentability standards could 
push some potential inventors into the realm of trade secret. Christopher A. 
Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 24 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 780 (2009) [hereinafter Cotropia, Inequitable Con-
duct] (citing John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty 
on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 981–82 (1984)). 
 27. See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 2010–2015 STRATEGIC 
PLAN 10–25 (2010), available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ 
USPTO_2010-2015_Strategic_Plan.pdf (describing several initiatives that will 
improve examination timelines and patent quality); Press Release, U.S. Patent 
& Trademark Office, Recently Announced Changes to USPTO’s Examiner 
Count System Go into Effect (Feb. 18, 2010), available at http:// 
www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2010/10_08.jsp (announcing changes to the examiner 
count system which will give examiners more time to review applications, re-
balance incentives, and improve morale in the examining corps). 
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would, at least in theory, improve the quality of issued pat-
ents.28
Yet, this is only part of the story. Irrespective of the sub-
stantive standards of patentability, procedural aspects of pat-
ent examination tip the scales in favor of issuance.
  
29 An appli-
cant enjoys a presumption of patentability,30 which means that 
at the time of filing the application is rebuttably presumed to 
comply with the utility, novelty, nonobviousness, and disclosure 
requirements of the patent statute.31 Thus, the Patent Office 
must issue a patent unless it can affirmatively prove that the 
invention is unpatentable.32 The scales tip even further toward 
issuance if the examiner lacks the time, materials, or incen-
tives to conduct a high-quality examination.33 And even though 
the applicant owes a duty of candor to the Patent Office,34 no 
one actually believes that everything that the applicant knows 
about the invention ends up before the examiner.35 Of course, 
this information deficit inevitably allows bad patents to slip 
through the cracks and further contributes to the patent quali-
ty problem.36 The bottom line is that anyone who files a patent 
application on anything starts off in a very good position.37
 
 28. See Hall & Harhoff, supra note 
 This 
3, at 993–94 (describing the interrela-
tionship between Patent Office resources, filing frequency, and the examina-
tion of individual applications on patent quality). 
 29. Cf. FTC REPORT, supra note 8, Executive Summary, at 8 (“A plethora 
of presumptions and procedures tip the scales in favor of the ultimate issuance 
of a patent, once an application is filed.”). 
 30. A presumption is an assumption that must be drawn by the 
decisionmaker in the absence of rebuttal evidence. 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, 
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2491, at 305 (John H. Chadbourn ed., 
rev. ed. 1981) [hereinafter WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE]. 
 31. See infra Part II.A. 
 32. See infra Part II.A. 
 33. See sources cited supra note 12; BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 21, at 23 
(“[A]n examiner has no incentive to spend more time on harder cases.”); Chris-
topher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 
MINN. L. REV. 101, 109 (2006) (“[T]he constraints of time, information, and ev-
identiary standards create a situation where ‘[t]he PTO’s evaluation of a pat-
ent [application] may be so poor or hurried as to be near meaningless.’” (quot-
ing Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 667–68 (2002))); Carl 
Shapiro, Patent System Reform: Economic Analysis and Critique, 19 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1017, 1019 (2004) (noting that patent examination is 
“tilted in favor of patent applicants”). 
 34. See infra note 131 (discussing 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2012)).  
 35. See infra notes 129–31, 285 and accompanying text. 
 36. See sources cited supra note 3; sources cited infra note 285. 
 37. Cf. FTC REPORT, supra note 8, ch. 5, at 9 n.61 (“[P]atent applicants 
are in a really great position because by filing an application they’re presump-
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strongly suggests that any plan to improve patent quality must 
confront the powerful role that the presumption of patentability 
plays in patent examination.38
This Article is the first to take a hard look at the presump-
tion of patentability.
  
39
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the pre-
sumption of patentability and current allocations of burdens of 
proof and explores several legal and expediential justifications 
for the paradigm. Part II argues that negative externalities 
arise from the current paradigm’s pro-applicant, pro-patent bi-
as, and that these externalities hinder patent reform efforts 
and impede the patent system’s overarching goal to promote 
scientific and technological progress. Finally, Part III sets forth 
a new paradigm which rebalances the scales of patentability. 
After describing the restructured evidentiary framework for  
patent examination, this Part offers a normative analysis of the 
new paradigm and explores its policy implications.  
 Aside from comprehensively exploring its 
origins, contours, proffered rationales, and continued viability, 
this Article offers an alternative paradigm which better pro-
motes the broader policy objectives of the patent system. It fills 
a gap in patent scholarship and will hopefully contribute to on-
going debates over patent reform. 
 
tively entitled to receive the grant.” (quoting Professor John R. Thomas)); 
Lemley & Sampat, supra note 2, at 192 (estimating that over 70% of applica-
tions eventually issue as patents); Dennis Crouch, USPTO Grant Rates by 
Technology Center, PATENTLY-O (May 27, 2010, 2:24 AM), http://www 
.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/05/uspto-grant-rate-by-technology-center.html 
(finding grant rates ranging from approximately 45%–80%, depending on the 
technology). 
 38. See FTC REPORT, supra note 8, ch. 5, at 9–10, 28 (identifying the pre-
sumption of patentability as one of the failings of ex parte patent examina-
tion); Leslie, supra note 33, at 108 (“Evidentiary standards provide an addi-
tional obstacle to PTO examiners denying patent applications.”). 
 39. It is important to note that the presumption of patentability is not the 
same as the presumption of validity which attaches to issued patents. See 35 
U.S.C. § 282 (2006) (codifying the presumption of validity); Microsoft Corp. v. 
i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2251–52 (2011) (reaffirming that the presump-
tion of validity can only be overcome with clear and convincing evidence). 
There is a robust body of scholarship on the latter. See, e.g., Lichtman & 
Lemley, supra note 18. 
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I.  UNDERSTANDING THE PRESUMPTION   
A. THE CURRENT PARADIGM 
Patent examination is an ex parte proceeding between the 
Patent Office examiner and the applicant.40 Driving it are evi-
dentiary mechanisms which include presumptions and shifting 
burdens of proof.41 The current paradigm emerged from centu-
ries-old Patent Office practices,42 later buttressed by decisional 
law from the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
(C.C.P.A.)43 and its successor court, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit.44
The basic tenet of patent examination is that an applicant 
is entitled to a patent unless the Patent Office can prove oth-
erwise.
 
45 The corollary is that a patent application presump-
tively complies with the statutory patentability requirements 
when it is filed—including utility, novelty, nonobviousness, and 
adequate disclosure of the invention.46 Thus, the burden of 
proving unpatentability rests with the Patent Office.47
Working in tandem with the presumption is a burden-
shifting framework which allocates the burden of proof between 
the examiner and the applicant. If it appears that the invention 
 
 
 40. See generally ALAN L. DURHAM, PATENT LAW ESSENTIALS § 5.1 (3d ed. 
2009) (explaining the process). 
 41. Id. 
 42. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 43. The C.C.P.A. was a five-judge Article III appellate court on the same 
level as the U.S. Courts of Appeals. See GILES S. RICH, A BRIEF HISTORY OF 
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CUSTOMS AND PATENT APPEALS 1–2 (1980).  
 44. The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 abolished the C.C.P.A. 
See Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 28 U.S.C.). Soon after its creation, the Federal Circuit adopted the C.C.P.A. 
decisional law as binding precedent. See South Corp. v. United States, 690 
F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc). 
 45. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“If examination at 
the initial stage does not produce a prima facie case of unpatentability, then 
without more the applicant is entitled to grant of the patent.”); FTC REPORT, 
supra note 8, ch. 5, at 8–9 (explaining that the Patent Office must issue a pa-
tent unless it proves unpatentability, thereby effectively creating a presump-
tion that every requested patent should issue). 
 46. See FTC REPORT, supra note 8, ch. 5, at 9–10 (exploring the consensus 
on this issue). 
 47. Oetiker, 977 F.2d at 1445 (“[T]he examiner bears the initial burden, on 
review of the prior art or on any other ground, of presenting a prima facie case 
of unpatentability. If that burden is met, the burden of coming forward with 
evidence or argument shifts to the applicant.”); accord In re Rijckaert, 9 F.3d 
1531, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (explaining that an examiner must affirmatively 
prove unpatentability). 
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does not satisfy a patentability requirement, the examiner has 
the initial burden of building and presenting a prima facie case 
of unpatentability.48
the information compels a conclusion that a claim is unpatentable 
under the preponderance of evidence, burden-of-proof standard, giv-
ing each term in the claim its broadest reasonable construction con-
sistent with [what is described in the patent application], and before 
any consideration is given to evidence which may be submitted in an 
attempt to establish a contrary conclusion of patentability.
 It is established when 
49
The type of proof required to make a prima facie case de-
pends on the statutory provision at issue. But, as a general 
matter, the examiner satisfies its initial burden by “adequately 
explain[ing] the shortcomings [he or she] perceives so that the 
applicant is properly notified and able to respond.”
 
50 If this 
burden is met,51 the burden of production shifts to the applicant 
to rebut the examiner’s contention of unpatentability with per-
suasive argument or proof.52 When the applicant submits rebut-
tal evidence, the examiner must “start over”53 and “consider all 
of the evidence anew.”54 The burden of production may continue 
to shift as each side presents new evidence; however, the exam-
iner carries the ultimate burden of persuasion.55 The examiner 
must determine patentability based on the entire record,56
 
 48. Oetiker, 977 F.2d at 1445; In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 
1986) (noting that the Patent Office must establish a prima facie case before 
any burden shifting occurs). 
 with 
 49. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b)(2) (2012). 
 50. Hyatt v. Dudas, 492 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 51. It is worth noting that if the examiner fails to establish a prima facie 
case, the applicant need not provide any rebuttal evidence and is entitled to a 
patent barring other grounds for unpatentability. In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 
710 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc) (citing In re Seigneurin, 474 F.2d 1020, 1023 
(C.C.P.A. 1973) (explaining that since no prima facie was established, “[t]hat 
concludes the matter”)). 
 52. Oetiker, 977 F.2d at 1445. 
 53. In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citing In re Rine-
hart, 531 F.2d 1048, 1052 (C.C.P.A 1976)). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Oetiker, 977 F.2d at 1449; see In re Epstein, 32 F.3d 1559, 1570 (Fed. 
Cir. 1994) (Plager, J., concurring) (articulating the rule that the Patent Office 
carries the burden of persuasion in showing why an applicant should not re-
ceive a patent).  
 56. See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COM-
MERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2164.05 (8th ed., rev. 8, 
2010) [hereinafter MPEP] (instructing the examiner to evaluate enablement 
based on the weight of all the evidence, including any new evidence supplied 
by the applicant to rebut the prima facie case); id. § 716.01(d) (giving a similar 
instruction for the nonobviousness analysis). 
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a preponderance of the evidence as the standard of proof.57 Ab-
sent any other grounds of unpatentability, the Patent Office 
must issue the patent.58
To illustrate the current framework, consider the following 
hypothetical. Suppose an inventor develops a method for mak-
ing bread with the highly-publicized fat substitute Olestra.
 
59 
Since Olestra is not available for retail purchase,60 the inventor 
develops the method by replacing the fat and a portion of the 
flour in a white bread recipe with pulverized Lay’s Light Origi-
nal Potato Chips (which are fried in Olestra).61 When the modi-
fied recipe yields an excellent loaf, the inventor prepares a pat-
ent application.62 Although the application’s written 
description63 only discloses a single working example (the modi-
fied white bread recipe), it states that the amount of potato 
chips and flour needed in other embodiments64
 
 57. Oetiker, 977 F.2d at 1445; In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 674 (Fed. Cir. 
1985) (“[P]reponderance of the evidence is the standard that must be met by 
the PTO in making rejections.”). 
 of the invention 
 58. Oetiker, 977 F.2d at 1445; Michel, supra note 22, at 1249 (“If the 
claimed invention is patentable, the applicant is entitled to a patent (because 
[§ 102 of] the statute says so)—not eventually, but as soon as patentability can 
be determined.”). 
 59. See, e.g., Marian Burros, U.S. Approves Fake Fat for Use in Snack 
Foods, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1996, at A12; Dana Canedy, Fat-Free Fanfare as 
Procter Starts Shipping Out Olestra, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1998, at D2. Olestra 
is an indigestible, fat-like molecule derived from sugar and vegetable oil acci-
dentally discovered by Procter & Gamble researchers around 1968. Vivienne 
V. Yankah & Casimir C. Akoh, Zero Energy Fat-Like Substances: Olestra, in 
STRUCTURED AND MODIFIED LIPIDS 511, 514–15 (Frank D. Gunstone ed., 
2001). It is a zero-calorie, non-fat oil, butter, and shortening substitute which 
tastes like fat. Id.; see also DAVID E. NEWTON, FOOD CHEMISTRY 82 (2007). 
 60. Currently Olestra is only available as an ingredient in certain snack 
foods. See Olestra, 21 C.F.R. § 172.867(c) (2012). 
 61. See Lay’s Light Original Potato Chips, FRITO LAY, http://www.fritolay 
.com/our-snacks/lays-light-original.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2012) (listing 
ingredients). 
 62. For examples of patents directed to methods of making bread with fat 
substitutes, see Process for Producing a Fat-Substitute Bakery Dough and the 
Fat Substitute Bakery Products, U.S. Patent No. 5,344,663 (filed Jan. 15, 
1992); Methods of Making Bread Products Without Shortenings and/or Oils, 
U.S. Patent No. 5,510,136 (filed Oct. 21, 1994). 
 63. The written description is the part of the patent (or patent applica-
tion) that completely describes the invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (“The 
specification shall contain a written description . . . . It shall conclude with one 
or more claims . . . .”). Although I will not do so in this Article, it is worth not-
ing that the terms “written description” and “specification” are often used in-
terchangeably (and mistakenly) in patent law. F. SCOTT KIEFF ET AL., PRINCI-
PLES OF PATENT LAW 155 n.4 (5th ed. 2011). 
 64. An “embodiment” is a concrete, physical form of an invention de-
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can be determined empirically to produce various types of leav-
ened and unleavened bread items such as other white breads, 
whole wheat breads, rye breads, buns, cinnamon rolls, bread-
sticks, pizza crusts, flour tortillas, and flatbreads.65
  A method of making bread products without using shortenings 
and/or oils comprising: substituting pulverized Olestra-based potato 
chips for said shortenings and/or oils in a bread dough which is baked 
to make bread products.
 The appli-
cation concludes with the following claim: 
66
In patent law, this is considered a “broad” claim because the 
language does not limit the invention to any specific type of 
bread.
 
67
An examiner with expertise in the field reads the applica-
tion and checks it for compliance with the statutory patentabil-
ity requirements.
 
68 Focusing on enablement, the question is 
whether a person having ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA)69 
could make and use the invention as broadly as it is claimed at 
the time of filing without undue experimentation.70 Analyzing 
enablement is a fact-intensive inquiry which includes constru-
ing the claim to determine its scope,71
 
scribed in a patent application or patent. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN 
FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 27 (5th 
ed. 2011). 
 evaluating the teaching 
 65. Cf. ’663 Patent col.15; ’136 Patent col.3. 
 66. Cf. Claim 1, ’136 Patent col.6 (making analogous claim that waxy bar-
ley flour can be substituted for shortenings and oils in bread dough). 
 67. See MIELE, supra note 11, at 98 (explaining an applicant’s incentive 
“to obtain very broad claims for which a colorable argument can be made for 
patentability”). 
 68. See supra note 3 (reciting the conditions for patentability). 
 69. The PHOSITA is a hypothetical construct of patent law akin to the 
reasonably prudent person in torts. See Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 
810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (explaining that a PHOSITA is “not un-
like the ‘reasonable man’ and other ghosts in the law”). Factors relevant to 
constructing the PHOSITA in a particular technical field include the sophisti-
cation of the technology, the educational level of the inventor, the educational 
level of active workers in the field, the types of problems encountered in the 
art, prior art solutions to those problems, and the rapidity with which innova-
tions are made. Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. 
Cir. 1983) (listing the factors). 
 70. In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Although the term 
“undue experimentation” does not appear in the statute, “it is well established 
that enablement requires that the specification teach those in the art to make 
and use the invention without undue experimentation.” In re Wands, 858 F.2d 
731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 71. See MPEP, supra note 56, § 2164.04 (instructing examiners to con-
strue claims before analyzing enablement). Claim construction includes defin-
ing terms that are ambiguous or are not well known in the art, while simulta-
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provided in the written description, and determining the 
PHOSITA’s knowledge and level of skill.72
The examiner rejects the claim as prima facie 
nonenabled.
  
73 Relying on a reference74 which describes the 
“complex” nature of baking,75 the examiner concludes that a 
PHOSITA could not read the applicant’s description about the 
single embodiment actually made (white bread) and extrapo-
late from it how to make without difficulty other embodiments 
encompassed by the claim (the universe of bread products).76
 
neously giving the claims the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent 
with the written description. In re Bass, 314 F.3d 575, 577 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 
And since the reference explains that bread quality is highly 
dependent on the identity and quantity of flour, fat, and other 
 72. Cf. Nat’l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 
F.3d 1190, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[W]ith respect to enablement[,] the relevant 
inquiry lies in the relationship between the [written description], the claims, 
and the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art.”). The Federal Circuit 
has articulated a nonexhaustive list of factors—the so-called Wands factors—
for determining undue experimentation, including (1) the amount of direction 
or guidance presented in the disclosure; (2) the existence of working examples; 
(3) the nature of the invention; (4) the predictability or unpredictability of the 
art; (5) the PHOSITA’s relative skill; (6) the state of the prior art; (7) the 
breadth of the claims; and (8) the quantity of experimentation necessary to 
practice the claimed invention. Wands, 858 F.2d at 737. Certain factors may 
be more relevant than others for a particular invention. See Amgen, Inc. v. 
Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that the 
Wands factors are illustrative and not mandatory). 
 73. To establish a prima facie case of nonenablement, the examiner must 
set forth a reasonable explanation as to why he or she believes that the scope 
of protection sought in that claim is not adequately enabled by the description 
of the invention provided in the written description. Wright, 999 F.2d at 1561–
62. 
 74. The examiner must support rejections with references. In re 
Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 224 (C.C.P.A. 1971); see also In re Brebner, 455 F.2d 
1402, 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (holding that the Patent Office must provide a fac-
tual basis for a lack of enablement rejection, rather than conclusory state-
ments as to the level of ordinary skill in the art). 
 75. “Bread quality is determined by the complex interactions of the raw 
materials, their qualities and quantities used in the recipe and the dough pro-
cessing method.” Stanley P. Cauvain, Breadmaking: An Overview, in BREAD 
MAKING: IMPROVING QUALITY 8, 14 (Stanley P. Cauvain ed., 2003). 
 76. Whether a single working example is sufficient to enable a broad 
claim is a quintessential enablement issue. Compare In re Vickers, 141 F.2d 
522, 525 (C.C.P.A. 1944) (explaining that an inventor “is generally allowed 
[broad] claims, when the art permits, which cover more than the specific em-
bodiment shown” (emphasis omitted)), with Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, 
Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (determining that a disclosure 
that enabled one embodiment was insufficient to support a claim that covered 
additional embodiments). 
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ingredients,77 the examiner concludes that a PHOSITA would 
have to engage in undue experimentation to practice the full 
scope of the claimed invention.78
The applicant responds with three rebuttal arguments. 
First, the applicant points out that the claim makes no mention 
of the quality of the bread product; thus any rejection relating 
to bread quality is improper.
  
79 Second, the applicant reminds 
the examiner that to satisfy enablement, one can rely on what 
is taught in the patent document as well as what the PHOSITA 
already knows or could figure out through routine experimen-
tation.80 Third and relatedly, the applicant argues that experi-
mentation that is laborious, tedious, time-consuming, or re-
quires the manipulation of multiple variables is not necessarily 
undue—particularly if it is routine or the nature of the art so 
demands.81 The applicant bolsters this argument with a book82
 
 77. Cauvain, supra note 
 
75, at 14–17. 
 78. See supra notes 70, 72 (describing the “without undue experimenta-
tion” requirement for enablement). 
 79. See Nat’l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 
F.3d 1190, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (explaining that enablement only focuses on 
what is actually claimed, but noting in dicta that an invention’s imperfect or 
crude operation does not defeat patentability).  
 80. AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“That is 
not to say that the specification itself must necessarily describe how to make 
and use every possible variant of the claimed invention, for the [PHOSITA’s] 
knowledge of the prior art and routine experimentation can often fill gaps, in-
terpolate between embodiments, and perhaps even extrapolate beyond the dis-
closed embodiments, depending upon the predictability of the art.”). But see 
ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharms., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 940–41 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(“[T]he rule that a specification need not disclose what is well known in the art 
is merely a rule of supplementation, not a substitute for a basic enabling dis-
closure . . . . To satisfy the plain language of § 112 para. 1, [an applicant] can-
not simply rely on the knowledge of [the PHOSITA] to serve as a substitute for 
the missing information in the specification.” (internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 81. See In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citing In re Jack-
son, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 804, 807 (Bd. App. 1982) (“The test is not merely 
quantitative, since a considerable amount of experimentation is permissible, if 
it is merely routine, or if the specification in question provides a reasonable 
amount of guidance with respect to the direction in which the experimentation 
should proceed . . . .”)); see also Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Cellpro, Inc., 152 F.3d 
1342, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding that repeating experiments to obtain suc-
cess is not undue experimentation); In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 502–03 
(C.C.P.A. 1976) (explaining that since limiting claim scope to embodiments ac-
tually made has downsides for patent policy, the unfortunate consequence is 
that a PHOSITA must engage in time-sensitive experimentation to figure out 
what works).  
 82. PAULA FIGONI, HOW BAKING WORKS: EXPLORING THE FUNDAMENTALS 
OF BAKING SCIENCE 480–81 (3d ed. 2011).  
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which teaches that using fat replacers in baking requires trial 
and error—a permissible type of experimentation.83
Upon reconsideration, after weighing all of the evidence, 
the examiner acquiesces and withdraws the enablement rejec-
tion.
 
84 Absent other grounds for unpatentability, the application 
proceeds to patent issuance.85
B. LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS 
 
1. Patent Office Practices 
History reveals that placing the ultimate burden of proving 
unpatentability with the examiner has been an established 
practice in the Patent Office for over a century. The principal 
cited authorities are a pair of old Patent Office rules and an 
intraoffice appeal from 1900 involving a paper fastener and a 
recalcitrant examiner.86 The first rule required the examiner to 
state the grounds for rejection with specificity.87 The second 
rule required the examiner to reconsider patentability if the 
applicant challenged a rejection, giving due care to the appli-
cant’s arguments.88 In the appeal, Ex parte Garms,89
 
 83. W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 
1983) (citing Minerals Separation, Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 270–71 (1916) 
(“leaving something to the skill [of the PHOSITA]” was sufficient for patenta-
bility because it was impossible for the patentee to disclose the precise, most 
successful treatment for each embodiment)).  
 the exam-
iner had rejected a claim for a paper fastener for a lack of nov-
elty based on the examiner’s personal knowledge of the subject 
matter. The second rule mentioned above required the examin-
er to support a personal-knowledge rejection with an affidavit 
 84. Once the applicant provides rebuttal evidence, the examiner “must 
then weigh all the evidence[,] including the specification and any new evidence 
supplied by [the] applicant with the evidence and/or sound scientific reasoning 
previously presented in the [initial] rejection and decide whether the claimed 
invention is enabled.” MPEP, supra note 56, § 2164.05. 
 85. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 86. See Leon Zitver, The Resolution of Doubt, 28 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 389, 
397–98 (1946) (exploring the history of placing the burden of proving 
unpatentability on the examiner). 
 87. See E. J. STODDARD, ANNOTATED RULES OF PRACTICE IN THE UNITED 
STATES PATENT OFFICE 226 (1920) (Rule 65, which explained that “[t]he rea-
sons for the rejection will be fully and precisely stated”); id. at 231 (Rule 66, 
which required the examiner to explain the pertinency of an asserted refer-
ence). 
 88. See id. at 226 (Rule 65). 
 89. 93 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 190 (1900). 
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(which the applicant could attack).90 The examiner refused to 
furnish an affidavit despite the rule and the applicant’s repeat-
ed requests.91 On appeal, the Commissioner of Patents scolded 
the examiner for his stubbornness and granted a petition to 
compel him to comply with the rule.92
Reliance on these authorities as support for the allocation 
of the burden of persuasion has been criticized.
  
93
  The ultimate burden of proof is borne by the same party through-
out a proceeding and is fixed by substantive law. The duty of produc-
ing evidence, that is, of going forward with the case, is a procedural 
matter and shifts back and forth between the parties as the proceed-
ings advance. [The cited authorities] deal only with [this] burden. The 
ultimate burden of proof is a matter beyond the scope of the Patent 
Office Rules of Practice, which are procedural and not substantive in 
nature.
 For instance, 
one commentator has argued that the authorities appear to 
have more to do with the (shifting) burden of producing evi-
dence: 
94
Nevertheless, these authorities anchor the “long-established 
custom” of placing the burden of proving unpatentability on the 
examiner.
 
95
Buttressing the presumption of patentability is the now-
defunct “rule of doubt.”
 
96 It required that all doubts as to pat-
entability were to be resolved in favor of the applicant.97
 
 90. When reference is made to facts within the personal knowledge of 
an employee of the office, the data shall be as specific as possible, and 
the reference must be supported, when called for, by the affidavit of 
such employee; such affidavit shall be subject to contradiction, expla-
nation, or corroboration by the affidavits of the applicant and other 
persons.  
 Attor-
ney General William Wirt first articulated the rule in 1827: “In 
every case of doubt, however, it would seem to be more congen-
STODDARD, supra note 87, at 232 (Rule 66 in pertinent part). 
 91. Garms, 93 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office at 190. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See, e.g., Zitver, supra note 86, at 398. 
 94. Id. (citing WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 30, §§ 2485–2489). 
 95. V. I. Richard, Ex Parte Appeals to the Board of Appeals. Outline of 
Practice, 25 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 303, 303 (1943). 
 96. In re Hofstetter, 362 F.2d 293, 297–99 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (tracing the or-
igins and evolution of the rule), vacated, Brenner v. Hofstetter, 389 U.S. 5, 5 
(1967). 
 97. Id. For additional commentary, see W. Becker & S. Heller, The “Rule 
of Doubt”—In re Hofstetter, 49 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 607 passim (1967); Edwin 
M. Thomas, Resolving Doubts Regarding Patentability, 20 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 
831 (1938); Zitver, supra note 86, at 397–98; Benjamin F. Lambert, Student 
Paper, Patentability—Rule of Doubt, 12 IDEA 703 passim (1968).  
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ial with the policy of the law to afford the citizen an opportuni-
ty of trying the validity of his right by issuing the patent.”98
The rule had become firmly entrenched within the agency 
by the end of the nineteenth century
 
99 and was widely applied 
by the courts hearing ex parte appeals from the Patent Office100 
for most of the twentieth century.101 In In re Hofstetter,102 the 
C.C.P.A. proffered “very sound policy reasons”103
 
 98. 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 52, 52 (1827). 
 for the rule: 
 99. This occurred after several twists and turns. Compare Ex parte Coes, 
6 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 1, 1 (1874) (explaining that giving the applicant the 
benefit of the doubt in all cases can result in the issuance of “frivolous pat-
ents”), with Ex parte Fanshawe, 57 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 1127, 1128 (1891) 
(noting that when a comparison of the claimed device and the prior art raises 
a doubt as to patentability, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the appli-
cant). 
 100. Beginning in 1927, an applicant whose claims had been rejected by 
the examiner could appeal to an intraoffice tribunal known as the Board of 
Appeals. See P. J. Federico, Evolution of Patent Office Appeals (Part II), 22 J. 
PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 920, 944–45 (1940). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit exercised exclusive jurisdiction over ex parte appeals from 
the Patent Office until 1929. See Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 48, 16 Stat. 
198, 205 (repealed 1929). At that time, jurisdiction was transferred to the 
C.C.P.A. See Act of March 2, 1929, ch. 488, §§ 1–2, 45 Stat. 1475, 1475–76; 
RICH, supra note 43, at 1. Alternatively, a disgruntled applicant who wanted 
to introduce additional evidence could file a civil action with the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 141, 145 (2006). Prior to 
the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982, appeals in civil actions remained 
with the D.C. Circuit. See Federico, supra, at 947. In sum, three appellate 
courts—the D.C. Circuit, C.C.P.A., and Federal Circuit—have heard appeals 
from the Patent Office.  
 101. See, e.g., In re Eastwood, 33 App. D.C. 291, 299–300 (D.C. Cir. 1909) 
(“[When it is] a doubtful question whether appellant’s discovery is not patent-
able . . . it has been the policy of this court to resolve the doubt in favor of the 
applicant.” (citing In re Thompson, 26 App. D.C. 419, 425 (D.C. Cir. 1906)); In 
re Sporck, 301 F.2d 686, 690–91 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (explaining that when there is 
a doubt as to the factual basis supporting the Board of Appeals’ conclusion of 
obviousness, “the doubt should be resolved in favor of the applicant”); In re 
Hummer, 241 F.2d 742, 746 (C.C.P.A. 1957) (“We think any doubt on the ques-
tion of patentability should be resolved in favor of the applicant.”); In re 
Uddenborg, 39 F.2d 710, 713 (C.C.P.A.1930) (“[T]he appellant has produced a 
new device which accomplishes a new and useful purpose and . . . the spirit 
and purpose of the patent law will be subserved by the grant of a patent to 
him. If there is any doubt about it, he should have the benefit of it.” (citations 
omitted)). The C.C.P.A. explained how the rule worked when applied in appel-
late proceedings: 
It was that if the court, after consideration of everything made availa-
ble to it by the record, was left in doubt about patentability (on any 
ground), such ultimate doubt should be “resolved” in favor of the ap-
plicant for patent. To state it another way, the applicant was “given 
the benefit” of the doubt. 
In re Naber, 503 F.2d 1059, 1060 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (per curiam). 
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  Several of the factors properly taken into account in determining 
patentability, specially unobviousness and utility, are often not 
known at the time when the application is being prosecuted in the  
Patent Office but are developed later, perhaps even after the patent is 
issued. It therefore is proper that doubt should be resolved in favor of 
applicants so that they shall not be denied patents which later events 
may show them entitled to. Among such events, which may even have 
to await patenting, are commercial success, unexpected utility, dis-
placement of competing devices, etc.104
Thus, the rationale behind the rule “was that patents are often 
granted with a view toward leaving open, to be decided by the 
courts, questions which the Patent Office does not deem it 
proper to adjudicate against the applicant by withholding the 
patent.”
 
105 Though the C.C.P.A. believed that the rule “ma[de] 
for a better and fairer . . . patent system,”106 the Supreme Court 
ultimately rejected this reasoning.107
While the rule of doubt was ultimately abandoned by the 
Patent Office
  
108 and the courts,109 the ultimate burden of prov-
ing unpatentability with the examiner has remained intact.110
 
 102. 362 F.2d 293 (C.C.P.A. 1966), vacated, Brenner v. Hofstetter, 389 U.S. 
5 (1967). 
 
 103. Id. at 298. 
 104. Id. (emphasis added); cf. 1 R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS 
§ 3:17 (4th ed. 2012) (contending that “the USPTO’s substantive determina-
tion of patentability is simply an initial determination of whether the applied-
for patent right appears likely to survive challenge before the courts” and that 
the agency’s determination “is less complete than the judicial determination of 
validity” (citing U.S. Patent Office, Study No. 25: Court Decisions as Guides to 
Patent Office Policy and Performance, in STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICI-
ARY, 86TH CONG., 2D. SESS., STUDY OF THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADE-
MARKS AND COPYRIGHTS (Comm. Print 1960) (written primarily by George C. 
Roeming))). 
 105. Lambert, supra note 97, at 706–07. The D.C. Circuit proffered a simi-
lar rationale: 
  In case of ordinary doubt, the policy of the patent system, as cus-
tomarily maintained in the Patent Office, has been to give the appli-
cant the benefit thereof, because no absolute right of property is con-
ferred by the grant of a patent. The patentee is merely put in a 
position to assert his prima facie right against infringers who may, in 
their defense, raise the question of the validity of the patent, and 
have the same finally adjudicated in the light of a full presentation 
and consideration of all the evidence attainable in respect of anticipa-
tion, prior knowledge, use, and the like. 
Thompson, 26 App. D.C. at 425 (internal citation omitted). 
 106. Hofstetter, 362 F.2d at 298. 
 107. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966) (“[I]t must be 
remembered that the primary responsibility for sifting out unpatentable ma-
terial lies in the Patent Office. To await litigation is—for all practical purpos-
es—to debilitate the patent system.”). 
 108. Edward J. Brenner, Comm’r of Patents, Patent Office Activities Dur-
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2. Statutory Considerations 
Another justification for the presumption of patentability 
comes from language in the Patent Act. Those who espouse this 
view point specifically to the introductory clause of § 102 of Ti-
tle 35 of the U.S. Code which states that “a person shall be en-
titled to a patent unless . . . .”111
Since § 102 deals with novelty, on its face the language 
seems to create a presumption of novelty. The C.C.P.A. recog-
nized as much in In re Wilder.
  
112 Yet the Federal Circuit has 
construed the language in that provision much more broadly to 
compel the Patent Office to demonstrate unpatentability for 
any of the patentability criteria.113
 
ing Fiscal Year 1966—Outlook for Fiscal Year 1967, Address Delivered to Pa-
tent Office Professional Staff (July 28, 1966), in 48 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 475, 476 
(1966) (“In order to further clarify Office policy . . . I wish to state here that it 
is our judgment that any application covering an invention of doubtful patent-
ability should not be allowed, unless and until such doubt is removed in the 
course of examination and prosecution . . . .” ). 
 One possible justification for 
 109. See In re Andersen, 743 F.2d 1578, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[T]he prem-
ise that doubts as to patentability should be resolved in favor of a patent ap-
plicant is now defunct.” (citation omitted)), overruled in part by In re Etter, 
756 F.2d 852 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Reynolds v. Aghnides, 356 F.2d 367, 367 (D.C. 
Cir. 1966) (per curium) (“[D]oubt (as to patentability) is to be resolved, not in 
favor of the applicant, but in favor of the correctness of administrative action.” 
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted)); Abbott v. Coe, 109 F.2d 449, 
451 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (“While the judgment of Patent Office officials is not abso-
lutely binding on the courts, it is entitled to great weight, and is to be over-
come by clear proof of mistake.” (citation omitted)); id. at 451 (noting further 
“[t]he presumption that the Patent Office is right”); In re Naber, 503 F.2d 
1059, 1060 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (per curiam) (explaining that doubts as to obvious-
ness in the case were resolved by the examination of facts and not “by any ar-
bitrary rule”); In re Mixon, 470 F.2d 1374, 1378–79 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (Worley, 
C.J., supplemental opinion) (inviting the court to abandon the rule for the sake 
of judicial uniformity, certainty, and lack of statutory support). 
 110. See supra Part I.A. 
 111. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).  
 112. 429 F.2d 447, 450 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (“[T]he statute provides for what 
may be said to be a presumption of novelty in the language of section 102 ‘a 
person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . .’” (emphasis added)). 
 113. FTC REPORT, supra note 8, ch. 5, at 8. In other words, as far as the 
presumption is concerned, the courts make no distinction between novelty and 
the other substantive requirements for patentability. See Tafas v. Doll, 559 
F.3d 1345, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (noting that the district court’s reliance on 
§ 102 that “[a] person shall be entitled to a patent unless” combined with Fed-
eral Circuit precedent places the initial burden of proving unpatentability on 
the Patent Office (citing In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992))); 
FTC REPORT, supra note 8, ch. 5, at 8 n.56 (noting the breadth of the presump-
tion as applied to all patentability criteria even though “the language relied 
upon, that a ‘person shall be entitled to a patent unless’ appears in § 102 of the 
Patent Act, dealing with novelty but not in § 103 (dealing with 
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this one-size-fits-all interpretation is that it would be unworka-
ble for applicants, the Patent Office, and the courts to handle 
different and unique presumptions and proof burdens for each 
of the individual statutory patentability requirements.114
The Federal Circuit also points to the introductory clause 
of § 102 as support for the locution of the initial burden of pro-
ducing evidence (of unpatentability) and the burden of persua-
sion.
  
115
  If the claimed invention is patentable, the applicant is entitled to a 
patent (because the statute says so)—not eventually, but as soon as 
patentability can be determined. Moreover, the burden of proof is on 
the PTO to show unpatentability, not on the applicant to establish pa-
tentability, and it remains on the PTO even if [it] has made a prima 
facie case.
 As former Federal Circuit Chief Judge Paul Michel once 
explained: 
116
This expansive interpretation of the clause not only places an 
applicant in a very good position,
 
117 but also impedes attempts 
“to weed out unwarranted patents.”118
The details of the clause’s drafting history also suggest 
that the Federal Circuit is reading too much into it. The 1952 
Patent Act was co-drafted by then-Examiner-in-Chief and Pat-
ent Office Board of Appeals member Pasquale J. (Pat) Federi-
co
 
119 and then-patent attorney and future C.C.P.A. and Federal 
Circuit Judge Giles Sutherland Rich.120
 
nonobviousness) or § 112 (dealing with enablement, written description, best 
mode and utility)”).  
 In a first-person ac-
count of the drafting of the clause, Judge Rich explained: 
 114. Thus, the Patent Office and the courts make no practical distinction 
between the different patentability criteria. But see Aristocrat Techs. Austl. 
PTY Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 543 F.3d 657, 662 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that 
while utility, patent-eligible subject matter, novelty, and nonobviousness are 
“conditions of patentability,” the disclosure requirements of § 112 are “merely 
requirements for obtaining a valid patent”). 
 115. Cf. FTC REPORT, supra note 8, Executive Summary, at 9 (“[T]he 
courts have interpreted the patent statute to require the PTO to grant a pat-
ent application unless the PTO can establish that the claimed invention does 
not meet one or more of the patentability criteria. Once an application is filed, 
the claimed invention is effectively presumed to warrant a patent unless the 
PTO can prove otherwise.”). 
 116. Michel, supra note 22, at 1249 (second emphasis added).  
 117. See supra notes 29–38 and accompanying text. 
 118. FTC REPORT, supra note 8, ch. 1, at 31–32. 
 119. For a short biographical sketch, see Giles S. Rich, P. J. (Pat) Federico 
and His Works, 64 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 3, 3–11 (1982). 
 120. See Judge Giles S. Rich, C.C.P.A., Congressional Intent—Or, Who 
Wrote the Patent Act of 1952?, Lecture Presented at the First Annual Insti-
tute on Patent Law (Mar. 21–22, 1963), in PATENT PROCUREMENT AND EX-
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  There is an interesting thing about the introductory clause of [sec-
tion] 102. Pat originally wrote “An invention shall not be considered 
new or capable of being patented if . . . .” As the drafting progressed, 
taking a tip from the Lanham Act, section 2, we turned it into the pos-
itive statement “A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . .” as 
it reads today. We just felt like slapping down the detractors of the 
patent system, many of whom were in the judiciary.121
Given the drafters’ motivation for the word choices, an expan-
sive interpretation of the clause’s language seems even more 
tenuous. 
 
C. EXPEDIENTIAL ARGUMENTS 
Since it is unlikely that Congress will tinker with the pat-
ent statutes any time in the foreseeable future,122 any efforts to 
change the presumption of patentability or the current alloca-
tions of the burdens of proof will likely come from the Federal 
Circuit.123
1. Information Gathering  
 Though the court points to § 102 as primary support 
for its stance, it is perhaps buttressed by one or more expedien-
tial considerations. 
Patent procurement imposes a substantial information 
burden on the Patent Office. As Professor Lee Petherbridge has 
explained: 
  The Patent Office has three primary information functions. Those 
functions include collection, use, and recordation. The Patent Office 
performs its “collection” function by (1) collecting information con-
cerning the boundaries of the property for which an applicant seeks 
the right to exclude and (2) collecting information concerning the pri-
or art [or other patently relevant factors]. The Patent Office performs 
 
PLOITATION 61, 67–69 (1963) (discussing the composition of the Drafting 
Committee for the bill that became the 1952 Patent Act). 
 121. Janice M. Mueller, A Rich Legacy, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 895, 902 
(1999) (quoting an e-mail from Judge Giles S. Rich to Janice Mueller, Assoc. 
Professor, The John Marshall Law School (Aug. 8, 1997)). The original lan-
guage appeared in the first bill introduced in Congress relating to what be-
came the Patent Act of 1952, H.R. 9133, in 1950. The text was changed in a 
subsequent bill, H.R. 3760, introduced in the next congressional session. Com-
pare H.R. 9133, 81st Cong. § 102 (2d Sess. 1950) (“An invention shall not be 
considered new or capable of being patented if . . . .”), with H.R. 3760, 82d 
Cong. § 102 (1st Sess. 1951) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent un-
less . . . .”). 
 122. In 2011, Congress made the most sweeping reform to U.S. patent law 
since 1952. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 
Stat. 284 (2011). 
 123. See sources cited supra note 22 (discussing the importance of the Fed-
eral Circuit in the development of U.S. patent law). 
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its “use” function by engaging in the substantive decision making that 
attends the statutory requirements for patentability. The Patent Of-
fice performs its “recordation” function by (1) recording information 
useful for defining the boundaries of the property and (2) recording 
information that shows how the boundaries of the patented property 
make that property completely and patentably distinct from property 
already in the public domain.124
The collection and use functions in particular can be very in-
formation-demanding inquiries.
 
125 For example, the Federal 
Circuit has articulated eight factors which can be relevant in 
determining whether an applicant’s disclosure satisfies the en-
ablement requirement; including the state of the prior art and 
the PHOSITA’s knowledge and level of skill.126 Nonobviousness 
is also a highly fact-intensive inquiry which (like enablement) 
depends on the nature of the technology and the PHOSITA’s 
knowledge and abilities.127 The information demands of these 
multifactor inquiries intensify as the subject matter becomes 
more complex.128
Solving the information-gathering problem is not easy. For 
instance, providing examiners with more time to work on com-
plex cases would at best provide an incomplete solution. As Pro-
fessor Joseph Scott Miller has argued: 
  
[E]ven if the Patent Office were to invest far more in reviewing appli-
cations, its review would still suffer from a basic knowledge deficit 
compared to that which well-informed inventors and their competi-
tors possess. Unlike these parties, the Patent Office is not actually 
 
 124. Lee Petherbridge, Positive Examination, 46 IDEA 173, 189 (2006). 
 125. See Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 62–
74 (2010) (exploring the information-demanding nature of the patentability 
requirements and the associated costs and externalities). 
 126. See discussion supra note 72 (discussing the test for enablement set 
forth in In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). 
 127. Christopher A. Cotropia, Nonobviousness and the Federal Circuit: An 
Empirical Analysis of Recent Case Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911, 929 
(2007). The nonobviousness requirement, embodied in § 103(a) of the Patent 
Act, denies patents for trivial extensions of what is already in the public do-
main. See John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innova-
tion, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1, 6–17 (2007) (exploring the wisdom of denying patents 
for trivial inventions). In Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966), the 
Supreme Court articulated the basic framework for determining 
nonobviousness. It is a question of law based on the following pertinent under-
lying facts: (1) the scope and content of the relevant prior art; (2) the differ-
ences between the prior art and the claimed invention; (3) the PHOSITA’s lev-
el of skill; and (4) secondary considerations which provide objective proof of 
nonobviousness, such as commercial success or that the invention fulfilled a 
long-felt but unsolved need. Id. at 17. 
 128. See Lee, supra note 125, at 67. 
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innovating on the leading edge of technological change in a given 
field.129
Applicants can do much to improve the information deficit be-
cause they “know better than [the Patent Office or] anyone else 
precisely what it is they have developed or invented . . . .”
 
130 The 
challenge is to get this knowledge into the examiner’s hands.131
Though it is well known that the Patent Office has prob-
lems gathering adequate information,
 
132 so too does the Federal 
Circuit.133 When the court adjudicates an ex parte appeal from 
the Patent Office, it receives a record which is limited to the 
prosecution history and proceedings before the Patent Office’s 
Patent Trial and Appeal Board.134 Unlike appeals from district 
courts, the Federal Circuit is precluded from the benefit of ad-
ditional evidence or factfinding.135
 
 129. Miller, supra note 
 Combined with the fact that 
2, at 733. 
 130. Id. at 734. 
 131. The Patent Office seeks to combat its information deficit by imposing 
upon applicants “a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the Office, 
which includes a duty to disclose to the Office all information known to that 
individual to be material to patentability . . . .” 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2012). 
 132. See, e.g., Petherbridge, supra note 124, at 189; sources cited supra 
note 2; sources cited infra note 283.  
 133. See Petherbridge, supra note 124, at 189 (explaining that while the 
Patent Office can collect information from a wide array of sources, “the other 
participants in the patent system, i.e., competitors, courts, and the public-at-
large cannot”). 
 134. 35 U.S.C. § 144 (2006) (“The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit shall review the decision from which an appeal is taken on the 
record before the Patent and Trademark Office.”); see also In re Gartside, 203 
F.3d 1305, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“In appeals from the Board, we have before 
us a comprehensive record that contains the arguments and evidence present-
ed by the parties . . . . That record, when before us, is closed . . . . [And] thus 
dictates the parameters of our review.”); In re Varga, 511 F.2d 1175, 1178 
(C.C.P.A. 1975) (explaining that § 144 limits the appeal to “evidence produced 
before the Patent Office”). Before passage of the America Invents Act in 2011, 
the tribunal was known as the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. See 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284, 290 
(2011) (eliminating interference proceedings). 
 135. See sources cited supra note 134; In re Jones, 10 F. App’x 822, 828–29 
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (“This court is not a fact-finder in the first instance . . . . [O]ur 
review is limited to the record before the Board.” (citing 35 U.S.C. § 144; 
Gartside, 203 F.3d at 1316)). To further explain the procedural aspects of pat-
ent appeals, an applicant whose claims have been twice rejected by the exam-
iner can appeal to an intraoffice tribunal (Board) which, among other things, 
reviews adverse decisions of examiners. See supra notes 100, 134; 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 6(b), 134(a) (2006); Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, §§ 3, 7. The Board 
can affirm a rejection or reverse and remand to the examining corps. 37 
C.F.R. § 1.197 (2012). An applicant dissatisfied with a Board decision can ap-
peal to the Federal Circuit or file a civil action against the Director in federal 
district court. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 141, 145 (2006) (placing venue with the U.S. 
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the Patent Office all-too-often lacks adequate information about 
the invention at the time of examination,136 it stands to reason 
that the Federal Circuit could face an information deficit when 
adjudicating an ex parte appeal.137
Viewed in this light, the current paradigm begins to make 
sense. The court imposes presumptions and allocates burdens 
of proof in such a way as to maximize the quantity of infor-
mation generated during examination to hopefully ensure the 
production of a robust record for appeal.
  
138 In deciding whether 
the applicant or the Patent Office is in the best position to pro-
vide this information, the court seems to believe—and perhaps 
not unreasonably so (even if not rightly)—that requiring the 
Patent Office to both go first by building a prima facie case of 
unpatentability and to carry the burden of persuasion on the 
patentability issue is the best way to achieve this goal.139
2. Concerns About Arbitrariness and Competence  
 
To the extent that the Federal Circuit views itself as the 
steward of the patent system140
 
District Court for the District of Columbia); Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 
§ 9(a) (amending § 145 by moving venue to the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia). In the latter, the parties may submit additional 
evidence or argue the previous evidence afresh. Hyatt v. Kappos, 625 F.3d 
1320, 1330–33 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (reaffirming that the applicant’s abil-
ity to introduce new evidence is the hallmark of a § 145 action and rejecting 
the Patent Office’s contention that “the applicant is only allowed to introduce 
new evidence that ‘the applicant could not reasonably have provided to the 
agency in the first instance’” (emphasis added)), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 1690, 1700–
01 (2012). 
 and as overseer of the Patent 
 136. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
 137. Cf. Petherbridge, supra note 124, at 189 (“Because the record becomes 
fixed . . . how well the Patent Office performs its information functions is a 
rate limiting step in the patent system and thus allocates information costs to 
other participants.”). 
 138. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 
86 IND. L.J. 779, 817–18 (2011) (noting that the Federal Circuit’s use of pre-
sumptions in the infringement context serves a “information-forcing” func-
tion). 
 139. Put simply, the court views the status quo as the most pragmatic way 
to get information in the ex parte appeal context. See Lee, supra note 125, at 
77–79 (arguing that in contrast to district court judges who can conduct com-
plicated factfinding and the Supreme Court which can take a “big picture” ap-
proach to patent cases, the Federal Circuit is primarily concerned with “every-
day practicality”). 
 140. See Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1747, 1797 (2011) (“[T]he Federal Circuit is in many ways the primary stew-
ard of substantive patent law.”); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Commentary, The Su-
preme Court and the Federal Circuit: Visitation and Custody of Patent Law, 
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Office,141 the court might have an interest in ensuring that the 
Patent Office is not making arbitrary patentability determina-
tions. This explains, at least in part, why the Federal Circuit 
and its predecessor142 have insisted that the Patent Office sup-
port determinations of unpatentability with factual evidence or 
sound technical reasoning143 rather than with conclusory 
statements144 or subjective judgments.145
Thus, it could be argued that the current proof paradigm 
exists simply to ensure fairness in patent examination. A dif-
ferent view is that it reflects skepticism about the Patent Of-
fice’s technical competence.
  
146
 
106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 28, 28 (2007), http://www 
.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/106/eisenberg.pdf (explaining that the Su-
preme Court “is free to grant certiorari [in patent cases] more often if it is un-
happy with the Federal Circuit’s stewardship”). 
 At least for enablement and 
 141. Cf. Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Constitution of Patent Law: The Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals and the Shape of the Federal Circuit’s Jurispru-
dence, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 843, 892 (2010) (referring to the C.C.P.A.’s “role as 
overseer of the Patent Office”); Clarisa Long, The PTO and the Market for In-
fluence in Patent Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1965, 1975 (2009) (“In addition to 
getting more autonomy from executive branch oversight, the PTO has also 
been trying to get more deferential review of its decisions from the Federal 
Circuit.”); id. at 1982 (“[T]he framework used by the Federal Circuit to deter-
mine whether future PTO-proposed rules are procedural or substantive con-
tinues to allow the court to oversee the PTO.”). 
 142. See supra note 43 (discussing the C.C.P.A.). 
 143. See, e.g., In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 224 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (noting 
that specific technical reasons are required to challenge enablement); accord 
In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (applying Marzocchi to the 
utility context). The Federal Circuit has held that the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, which governs Patent Office tribunals and the related judicial re-
view, requires the agency to provide a record with full, reasoned, and well-
articulated explanations for its conclusions. In re Sang-Su Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 
1342 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999)). 
 144. See In re Brebner, 455 F.2d 1402, 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (holding that 
the Patent Office must provide a factual basis for a lack of enablement rejec-
tion, rather than conclusory statements regarding the PHOSITA’s level of 
skill); In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[R]ejections on obvious-
ness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, 
there must be some articulated reasoning with some rationale underpinning to 
support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” (quoted in KSR Int’l v. Teleflex 
Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007)). 
 145. For examples of courts chastising the Patent Office for subjective 
judgments, see In re Newman, 782 F.2d 971, 974 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (explaining 
that the Patent Office should not attempt to ascertain the scientific explana-
tions because the agency “is not a guarantor of scientific theory”), and In re 
Ratti, 270 F.2d 810, 814 (C.C.P.A. 1959) (rejecting the Patent Office’s conten-
tion that an invention must possess “some definite advantage over the prior 
art” in order to be patentable) (emphasis omitted)). 
 146. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? 
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nonobviousness—the patentability requirements involving 
highly fact-intensive inquiries—it is probably a bit of both.147
If the patent examiner can point to something in the prior art that in-
dicates that some embodiments of the claimed invention will be im-
possible to make without more information than the inventor has dis-
closed, then the application may be rejected. But if the examiner 
cannot point to such an indication in the prior art, [P]atent [O]ffice 
policy dictates that even very broad claims may be allowed. This 
means that claims . . . often are allowed to cover ground that examin-
ers believe, but cannot prove, is well beyond the area actually ex-
plored and disclosed by the inventor. The rule puts the burden of dis-
proving enablement on the examiner. The rationale is that any other 
rule would leave claim scope too much in the hands of individual ex-
aminers and their technological forecasting abilities.
 To 
see how, consider the helpful discussion that Professors Robert 
Merges and Richard Nelson provide in the case of enablement: 
148
If claim scope is to be narrowed, that task “is left to the courts 
in particular infringement suits.”
 
149
II.  NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES   
 
A. ON PATENT REFORM 
As noted earlier, certain practices and procedures at the 
Patent Office have contributed to the issuance of low-quality 
patents.150 The agency’s leadership recognizes the problem151
 
What the Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 
269, 299 (2007) (“[T]he Federal Circuit has repeatedly stated that it grants no 
deference whatsoever to PTO legal interpretations.”); Craig Allen Nard, Defer-
ence, Defiance, and the Useful Arts, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1415, 1449–50 (1995) 
(raising the issue of technical competence and noting concerns from the mem-
bers of the patent bar “who believe that the PTO could be more efficient and 
technologically savvy”); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-
Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 
1068–69 (2003) (arguing that the Federal Circuit should be more willing to de-
fer to the Patent Office’s technical expertise). 
 
 147. See supra notes 125–27 and accompanying text. It is important to note 
that enablement and nonobviousness as legal questions are reviewed de novo 
by the court. See In re ’318 Patent Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 1317, 1323 
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (enablement); In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (nonobviousness). 
 148. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of 
Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 848–49 (1990) (internal citations omit-
ted).  
 149. Id. at 849 (emphasis added); cf. supra notes 102–05 and accompanying 
text (exploring the view that the Patent Office’s examination is just an initial 
determination of issues that must be resolved by the courts).  
 150. See supra notes 11–18 and accompanying text. 
 151. See, e.g., Request for Comments on Enhancement in the Quality of  
Patents, 74 Fed. Reg. 65,093, 65,093–100 (Dec. 9, 2009); David Kappos, Talk-
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and has taken steps to provide the examining corps with the 
time, tools, and incentives necessary to help ensure a more ro-
bust examination of patent applications.152 It is hoped that  
these measures will reduce the number of questionable patents 
that issue.153
But the presumption of patentability and current alloca-
tions of burdens of proof pose major obstacles to achieving this 
goal. Even if examiners are better equipped and more incentiv-
ized to do their job, compelling them to affirmatively prove 
unpatentability still gives applicants the upper hand in the 
process. As explained in the Federal Trade Commission’s 2003 
report on the patent system and legislative and administrative 
changes that could improve it:  
 
  The ex parte nature of the [examination] proceeding leaves the ex-
aminer on his or her own to evaluate and challenge applicants’ asser-
tions. Because the courts have placed the burden on the PTO to 
demonstrate grounds for rejecting a patent, rather than on the appli-
cant to demonstrate that it meets the statutory criteria, difficulties in 
assembling responsive evidence work in favor of patent applicants.154
This predilection toward patent issuance counteracts efforts to 
both improve patent examination quality and to reduce overall 
application volume (and hence, the application backlog)
 
155 by 
deterring filings for frivolous inventions.156
B. ON INNOVATION AND PATENT POLICY 
 
The patent system’s overarching goal is to promote scien-
tific and technological progress.157
 
ing Quality, DIRECTOR’S FORUM: DAVID KAPPOS’ PUB. BLOG (Sept. 3, 2010, 
9:19 AM), http://www.uspto.gov/blog/director/entry/talking_quality. 
 In theory, each of the indi-
 152. See sources cited supra note 27. 
 153. See sources cited supra notes 27, 151. 
 154. FTC REPORT, supra note 8, ch. 5, at 8; see also id. Executive Sum-
mary, at 8 (“A plethora of presumptions and procedures tip the scales in favor 
of the ultimate issuance of a patent, once an application is filed.”). 
 155. See supra note 17. 
 156. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing how a robust ex-
amination regime can discourage frivolous filings, whereas a lax regime has 
the opposite effect). 
 157. This goal emanates from the Intellectual Property Clause of the Con-
stitution: “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Bilski v. 
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3236 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (explaining that 
Intellectual Property Clause empowered Congress to pass “a series of patent 
laws . . . as a means of encouraging innovation”); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 
186, 223–24 (2003) (noting that the constitutional command for “limited 
times” is the “ultimate purpose” of the patent system); Motion Picture Patents 
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vidual statutory requirements for patentability seeks to further 
this objective.158 But given that the presumption of patentabil-
ity presupposes that every patent application fully complies 
with each requirement,159
It seems that the negative impact of the presumption has a 
greater adverse effect on some statutory requirements than on 
others. For instance, certain judicially created rules and stand-
ards pertaining to the law of novelty
 an important question is whether the 
presumption of patentability can interfere with the functioning 
of the statutory requirements and actually impede scientific 
and technological progress. 
160 and nonobviousness161
 
Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917) (“[T]he primary pur-
pose of our patent laws . . . is ‘to promote the progress of science and useful 
arts.’” (citations omitted)); EDWARD WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE 125–26 (2002) (explaining that in the latter 
part of the eighteenth century, the term “science” was synonymous with 
“knowledge” and “learning”); Karl B. Lutz, Patents and Science: A Clarifica-
tion of the Patent Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50, 
54 (1949) (noting that the term “useful arts” is synonymous with the word 
“technology”). 
 
 158. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 
148 (1989) (noting that an invention which lacks novelty not only adds nothing 
to the sum of human knowledge, but “would in fact injure the public by remov-
ing existing knowledge from public use”); Nat’l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Mag-
netic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1195–96 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting 
that the purpose of the enablement requirement is to ensure enrichment of 
public knowledge); Stiftung v. Renishaw PLC, 945 F.2d 1173, 1180 (Fed. Cir. 
1991) (“The utility requirement has its origin in article I, section 8 of the Con-
stitution, which indicates that the purpose of empowering Congress to author-
ize the granting of patents is ‘to promote progress of . . . useful arts.”’).  
 159. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 160. Novelty ensures that an invention is new by denying a patent if the 
claimed subject matter is identical to what is already known. See 35 
U.S.C. §§ 101–102 (2006); In re Marshall, 578 F.2d 301, 304 (C.C.P.A. 1978) 
(citations omitted). An invention enjoys a presumption of novelty, which 
means that the examiner must prove that the invention already exists in the 
prior art. In re Wilder, 429 F.2d 447, 450 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (quoting § 102, which 
states that “a person shall be entitled to a patent unless [one of the statutory 
exclusions is shown]”); see also supra Part I.A. To illustrate how the novelty 
doctrine can temper the presumption, suppose that the invention at issue is a 
device, and the examiner finds a prior art reference which discloses a picture 
of an identical device but does not explain how to make it. The courts have 
held that the examiner is allowed to presume that a PHOSITA could have 
made the device disclosed in the prior art. In re Antor Media Corp., 689 F.3d 
1282, 1287–88 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 
314 F.3d 1313, 1355 & n.21 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (explaining this presumption and 
its roots in policy). To move forward, the burden shifts to the applicant to 
prove that a PHOSITA could not have made the device without undue experi-
mentation. Id. (citing In re Sasse, 629 F.2d 675, 681 (C.C.P.A. 1980)). If the 
applicant cannot do this, the device is unpatentable for a lack of novelty. See 
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can temper the presumption in certain situations by placing a 
heavier burden on the applicant.162 Denying a patent in these 
situations fulfills a basic policy objective of the patent system: 
to not allow a patent to issue which would impinge upon the 
public’s right to unfettered access to technology already in the 
public domain.163
 
Wilder, 429 F.2d at 450–52 (outlining the burden-shifting process); In re Ja-
cobs, 318 F.2d 743, 745 (C.C.P.A. 1963) (stating that an applicant must carry 
the burden of proof to prevail). 
 
 161. Nonobviousness ensures that an invention is “new enough.” 1 DONALD 
S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 3.01, at 3–9 (2012); see also Joseph Scott 
Miller, Nonobviousness: Looking Back and Looking Ahead, in 2 INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH 2 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007) 
(“[N]onobviousness divides the patentably new from the unpatentably new.”). 
The law denies patents for trivial extensions of technology already in the pub-
lic domain. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006); see sources cited supra note 127. 
Nonobviousness does not target inventions that are identically disclosed in the 
prior art, but rather those that are sufficiently close to the prior art and within 
the PHOSITA’s technical grasp at the time the claimed invention is made. 35 
U.S.C. § 103(a); see CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 305 (2d ed. 
2011). An examiner must evaluate nonobviousness by considering the scope 
and content of the relevant prior art; the differences between the prior art and 
the claimed invention, the PHOSITA’s level of skill, and secondary considera-
tions which provide objective proof of nonobviousness. Graham v. John Deere 
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). The scope and flexible nature of the 
nonobviousness standard “has traditionally represented the principal substan-
tive hurdle for patentability.” Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal 
Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 
19 (2004). See generally NONOBVIOUSNESS—THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PA-
TENTABILITY (John F. Witherspoon ed., 1980) (providing a compilation of 
words addressing the nonobviousness standard). Importantly for present pur-
poses, the barrier is now much higher than before, following a recent Supreme 
Court decision which makes it easier to reject patent applications for a lack of 
nonobviousness. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) 
(rejecting the Federal Circuit’s rigid test for nonobviousness due to its incon-
sistency with the “expansive and flexible” approach set forth in Supreme 
Court precedent). After KSR, the Director of the PTO even stated that “some 
claims that may have been found to be non-obvious before KSR will now cor-
rectly be found to be obvious.” David A. Kappos, The Impact of KSR, DIRS. FO-
RUM: DAVID A. KAPPOS’ PUB. BLOG (Nov. 24, 2009, 1:58 PM), http://www 
.uspto.gov/blog/director/entry/the_impact_of_ksr. 
 162. See, e.g., Antor Media, 689 F.3d at 1287–88; see also discussion supra 
note 160. 
 163. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 65 (1998); see also Aronson v. 
Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (“[T]he stringent require-
ments for patent protection seek to assure that ideas in the public domain re-
main there for the use of the public.”); Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & 
Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[N]o patent should be granted 
which withdraws from the public domain technology already available to the 
public.” (citing Graham, 383 U.S. at 6)). 
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However, the situation is quite different for enablement—
the patentability requirement which “lies at the heart of the 
patent bargain . . . .”164 By requiring an applicant to provide a 
disclosure sufficient to teach a PHOSITA how to make and use 
the full scope of the invention without undue experimenta-
tion,165 enablement ensures that the applicant’s disclosure suf-
ficiently enriches public knowledge in exchange for the gov-
ernment-granted right to exclude.166 There is hope that the 
knowledge gained will reduce R&D waste,167 spur creativity,168 
and ultimately extend the frontiers of science and technology.169
Importantly, and in contrast to novelty and 
nonobviousness, the presumption of patentability is not tem-
pered in the enablement context because the substantive law of 
enablement has a strong pro-patent bias.
 
170
 
 164. 3 CHISUM, supra note 
 This becomes clear 
when one looks at the burden faced by an examiner who wants 
to mount an enablement challenge. The key factor in the ena-
blement inquiry is the substantive teaching provided in the ap-
161, § 7.01, at 7–9; see LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth 
Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1344–45 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (describing ena-
blement as the essential aspect of the patent bargain).  
 165. See supra notes 70, 72 (describing the “without undue experimenta-
tion” requirement for enablement). 
 166. See Nat’l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 
F.3d 1190, 1195–96 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 
533 (1966) (“[O]ne of the purposes of the patent system is to encourage dissem-
ination of information concerning discoveries and inventions.”); 
WALTERSCHEID, supra note 157, at 143 (explaining that an essential purpose 
of the patent system under the quid pro quo (or “exchange-for-secrets”) ra-
tionale is to assure the dissemination to the public of technical information it 
would not otherwise get); FTC REPORT, supra note 8, ch. 4, at 3–4 (explaining 
that enablement plays a central role in “safeguard[ing] the patent system’s 
disclosure function by ensuring relatively swift dissemination of technical in-
formation from which others . . . can learn”). 
 167. See Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 
J. LEGAL STUD. 247, 267 n.79 (1994). 
 168. See MICHAEL A. GOLLIN, DRIVING INNOVATION 15–19 (2008) (explain-
ing that disclosure adds to the pool of accessible knowledge which other crea-
tive individuals can use and improve upon); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclo-
sure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 548–49 (2009) (“[D]isclosure can stimulate others to 
design around the invention or conceive of new inventions—either by improv-
ing upon the invention or by being inspired by it—even during the patent 
term.” (citations omitted)); Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 
SMU L. REV. 123, 132–33 (2006) (making a similar argument). 
 169. See ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT 
LAW § 1.2, at 6 (2004) (noting that patents enrich the public domain and thus 
support further innovation). 
 170. Sean B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts, 
56 UCLA L. REV. 127, 143–54 (2008). 
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plicant’s disclosure.171 Gauging the sufficiency of this teaching 
is easiest when the examiner can evaluate actual experimental 
data or the details of one or more working embodiments of the 
invention.172 But unlike the rules of mainstream science, which 
“require actual performance of every experimental detail”173 as 
a prerequisite for publication, in patent law an applicant can 
obtain a patent with no (or very little) actual proof of concept or 
pre-filing experimentation.174 In fact, patent law “explicitly as-
sumes the need for more experimentation after filing to actual-
ly implement the invention.”175 Nevertheless, examiners must 
afford every application a presumption of enablement even if 
there is minimal teaching disclosed therein.176
While this presumption might not be a cause for concern 
for simple inventions like paper clips and broom rakes,
  
177 it 
raises questions for more complex inventions like chemical 
compounds or sophisticated devices.178
 
 171. See Sitrick v. DreamWorks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(noting that an enablement analysis begins with the disclosure). 
 These inventions often 
 172. Cf. Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 621, 652–53 (2010) [hereinafter Seymore, Teaching Function] 
(advocating for a working example requirement for complex technologies 
which would, among other things, simplify the enablement analysis). 
 173. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1377 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., dissenting).  
 174. See, e.g., Gould v. Quigg, 822 F.2d 1074, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“The 
mere fact that something has not previously been done clearly is not, in itself, 
a sufficient basis for rejecting all applications purporting to disclose how to do 
it.” (quoting In re Chilowsky, 229 F.2d 457, 461 (C.C.P.A. 1956))). It is well 
settled in U.S. patent law that the concept itself—and not any physical act—is 
the key facet of the inventive process. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 
55, 60–61 (1998) (“[T]he word ‘invention’ in the Patent Act unquestionably re-
fers to the inventor’s conception rather than to a physical embodiment of that 
idea.”). 
 175. Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 
HASTINGS L.J. 65, 93 (2009) [hereinafter Cotropia, Early Filing] (citing Impax 
Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharm., Inc., 545 F.3d 1312, 1314–15 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). 
 176. See In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 223 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (explaining 
that the Patent Office must accept the applicant’s disclosure “as in compliance 
with the enabling requirement of the first paragraph of § 112 unless there is 
reason to doubt the objective truth of the statements contained therein which 
must be relied on for enabling support”); In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995) (“[A]pplicants should not have been required to substantiate their 
presumptively correct disclosure to avoid a rejection under the first paragraph 
of § 112.” (citing Marzocchi, 439 F.2d at 224)). 
 177. See Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 172, at 644 (arguing that 
a PHOSITA can make simple inventions with a minimal amount of teaching 
from the inventor). 
 178. See id. 
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require detailed teaching and guidance for the PHOSITA to 
make and use.179 The absence of working examples, combined 
with the aforementioned information deficit,180 make it hard for 
examiners to adequately gauge enablement.181 It is also likely 
that a PHOSITA will need to engage in undue experimentation 
to practice the full scope of the invention.182
Though it is true that the Federal Circuit has started to po-
lice compliance with enablement more aggressively in recent 
years,
  
183
 
 179. See id. at 644–45 (arguing that PHOSITAs in complex fields must of-
ten engage in trial and error to figure out what works; in fields like chemistry, 
there is a danger that embodiments not actually reduced to practice cannot be 
made); see also Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1379–80 
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (determining that a disclosure which enabled an injector with 
a pressure jacket was insufficient to support a claim that covered injectors 
both with and without a pressure jacket); AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 
1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (explaining that a written description which only 
described a single embodiment of the invention, using aluminum with a cer-
tain percentage of silicon, failed to enable claims covering embodiments with 
other percentages of silicon).  
 the fact still remains that an examiner who questions 
enablement still bears the burdens of both building a prima fa-
cie case of nonenablement and carrying the ultimate burden of 
 180. See discussion supra Part I.C.1. 
 181. See, e.g., Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Chemtronics, Inc., 439 F.2d 
1369, 1378–79 (5th Cir. 1970) (noting that in the absence of its own testing 
facilities, the Patent Office must rely on information presented to it); FTC RE-
PORT, supra note 8, ch. 5, at 9 (“Yet the PTO lacks testing facilities, and asser-
tions that cannot be overcome by documentary evidence promptly identifiable 
by the examiner often must be accepted.”). A Patent Office official has ex-
plained the problem: 
  [T]o a large degree when the going gets tough, certainly the appli-
cant is in the position to have the experts to do the testing, to submit 
documentary evidence to show why the examiner should allow the 
case. And, of course[,] we don’t have laboratories, and we don’t have 
independent experts in that regard. So therefore, we are really com-
pelled to accept some of that, particularly from the standpoint of the 
fact finding, that is presented to us. 
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Stephen G. Kunin, former Deputy Com-
missioner for Patent Examination Policy at the Patent Office). 
 182. In certain complex fields, “the technical scope and substance of the 
disclosure are very important because the PHOSITA must rely heavily, if not 
exclusively, on the instruction provided within the four corners of the patent 
document in order to practice the invention.” Sean B. Seymore, Patently Im-
possible, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1491, 1528 (2011); see also Chiron Corp. v. Genen-
tech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (making a similar observation); 
In re Strahilevitz, 668 F.2d 1229, 1232 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (explaining that work-
ing examples are desirable in complex technologies). 
 183. See, e.g., ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharm., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 940 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010); cases cited supra note 179. 
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persuasion on the issue.184 These burdens tip the scales toward 
patent issuance not only because of the examiner’s time pres-
sures and incentives discussed above,185 but also because “[i]t is 
actually very difficult to offer rigorous proof that something 
cannot be done . . . .”186
While all would agree that the issuance of nonenabled pat-
ents is far from ideal, there is less consensus as to whether or 
how to address the problem. For instance, it has been argued 
that suboptimal enablement is not surprising—and perhaps 
justifiable—given that “the patent law[s] place[] strong pres-
sure on filing the patent application early in the development of 
the technology, often before . . . all of the boundaries [are] fully 
explored.”
 Thus, it is easy to see how dubiously en-
abled patents (and thus, patents of dubious quality) can slip 
through the cracks.  
187
Commentators point out that inventors must often file be-
fore actually reducing the invention to practice in order to at-
tract investors,
  
188 minimize risk,189 and to safeguard patent 
rights in the United States and abroad.190
 
 184. See discussion supra Part I.A.  
  
 185. See supra notes 11–18 and accompanying text. 
 186. Arthur Kantrowitz, Proposal for an Institution for Scientific Judg-
ment, 156 SCIENCE 763, 764 (1967); see also Edward C. Walterscheid, Insuffi-
cient Disclosure Rejections (Part I), 62 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 217, 219–20 (1980) 
(explaining that obtaining proof can be a major problem for examiners, partic-
ularly since they must provide reasons and evidence to establish a prima facie 
case of unpatentability). 
 187. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1536 
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Newman, J., concurring) (emphasis added), rev’d on 
other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997); see also Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and 
Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 267–71 (1977) [hereinaf-
ter Kitch, Nature and Function] (explaining the rules in patent law that force 
and permit early filing). 
 188. It is axiomatic in patent law that many inventors must rely on inves-
tors to cover the hefty costs of patent procurement and commercialization. See 
JOHN SAMSON, INVENTIONS AND THEIR COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT 51 (1896) 
(“To have the use of capital is nearly always indispensable for the development 
of an invention, and, unless the inventor is of that fortunate class who have 
the means to work their own patents, he must appeal for support to one or 
more people with money.”); Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age 
of Venture Capital, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 137, 143–44 (2000) (dis-
cussing the need for venture capital); Craig Allen Nard, Certainty, Fence 
Building, and the Useful Arts, 74 IND. L.J. 759, 759 (1999) (“The prospect of 
certainty in the patentee’s property interest has several benefits, one of which 
is to create a sense of security which permits the patentee to secure risk capi-
tal from investors, which in turn facilitates the commercialization of the 
claimed invention.” (citing Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599 
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (“[E]ncouragement of investment-based risk is the fundamen-
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But this problem warrants more attention because allow-
ing dubiously enabled patents to issue can impede scientific 
and technological progress. For example, the current regime 
encourages inventors to file patents on underdeveloped inven-
tions, or worse, on mere ideas.191 Such patents often provide 
dubious guidance to the PHOSITA, add little or nothing to the 
public storehouse of technical knowledge,192 and supply little 
technical fodder for follow-on researchers to build upon.193 In 
addition, these patents can create insurmountable roadblocks 
(intentionally or not)194 for others with meritorious inven-
tions.195
 
tal purpose of the patent grant . . . .”))). 
  
 189. See, e.g., Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 
341, 393–94 (2010) (“If building a prototype is costly—take, for example, fabri-
cating a new type of computer chip—the risks of not securing a patent [before 
actual reduction to practice] may be too large to justify doing so.”). 
 190. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (encouraging diligence by penalizing in-
ventors for delay in filing patent applications); Convention on the Grant of Eu-
ropean Patents, art. 54(2), Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 255, 272 (invoking an 
absolute novelty requirement which regards any pre-filing disclosure, includ-
ing activity by the inventor, as patent defeating). 
 191. Cf. Christopher A. Harkins, Fending Off Paper Patents and Patent 
Trolls: A Novel “Cold Fusion” Defense Because Changing Times Demand It, 17 
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 407, 453 (2007) (explaining that the lack of a require-
ment for an inventor “[to] actually have a complete and operative inven-
tion . . . [at the time of filing increases the] potential that the [claims] will pro-
tect speculative ideas . . . . With just a little time, money, and imagination, one 
may [obtain a patent] . . . without inventing anything . . . .”). 
 192. See infra note 305 and accompanying text. 
 193. In other words, the disclosure probably lacks sufficient technical detail 
to be helpful. Thus, it does little to advance technological progress, which is 
commanded by the Constitution. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 
(1966). 
 194. For instance, so-called “nuisance” prior art describing an unworkable 
invention “can . . . be generated as a result of a bona fide attempt at a con-
structive reduction to practice that for some unexpected reason fails to work as 
disclosed.” David S. Wainwright, Patenting Around Nuisance Prior Art, 81 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 221, 223–24 (1999). Innocuously disclosed in-
formation which has the same effect is often described as “technical junk.” Id. 
at 222, 223 n.3. 
 195. A good example is when an early filer strategically drafts claims 
which cover undeveloped technology. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 19, at 
67 (arguing that the practice “penalizes real innovators who operate in the 
shadow of early, broad claims”); Wainwright, supra note 194, at 221–22 (ex-
plaining how nuisance prior art can discourage applicants to the point of 
abandoning their patent applications); see also Michael J. Meurer & Craig Al-
len Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim Scope: A New Perspective 
on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947, 1975 (2005) (exploring the 
practice and discussing how patent prosecutors draft claims to “mitigate prob-
lems with language and later-developed technology”). 
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III.  TOWARD A PRESUMPTION OF UNPATENTABILITY   
This Article has shown that various presumptions and pro-
cedural aspects of patent examination tip the scales in favor of 
issuance once a patent application is filed. And since applicants 
are presumptively entitled to receive a patent, anyone who files 
a patent on anything is “in a really great position” from the 
outset.196 From an evidentiary standpoint, the biggest problem 
facing an examiner who seeks to challenge patentability is the 
dual burden of building a prima facie case of patentability and 
carrying the ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue by a 
preponderance of the evidence.197 According to current case law, 
the Patent Office must issue a patent if the examiner fails to do 
both.198
A. RESTRUCTURING THE PROOF PARADIGM 
 To address this problem and rebalance the scales of pat-
entability, this Part offers a new evidentiary framework for  
patent examination. 
1. How It Would Work 
The starting point for the proposal is that rebalancing the 
scales of patentability—and thus making the issuance of a pat-
ent far from a sure thing—will require three key changes in the 
rules of patent examination. First, the locution of the dual bur-
dens would be decoupled such that the initial burden of coming 
forward with evidence of unpatentability (building a prima fa-
cie case) would remain with the examiner but the burden of 
persuasion on the ultimate issue would now rest with the ap-
plicant. Second, the current presumption of patentability would 
be replaced with a presumption of unpatentability. As a result, 
an applicant who could not adduce proof of patentability by a 
preponderance of the evidence would face a rejection. Third, in 
an effort to produce more technically robust patents, the re-
strictions on amending patent documents after filing would be 
relaxed so that an applicant who adduces proof of patentability 
could incorporate the additional information into the issued pa-
tent. 
 
 196. FTC REPORT, supra note 8, ch. 5, at 9 n.61 (“[P]atent applicants are in 
a really great position because by filing an application they’re presumptively 
entitled to receive the grant.” (quoting Professor John R. Thomas)). 
 197. See supra Part I.A. 
 198. See supra note 45. 
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2. Illustrations 
Adopting this framework would recalibrate the entire pat-
ent procurement process by making it less pro-applicant. Yet, 
given the differences between the various statutory standards 
of patentability, it stands to reason that the proposed regime 
would have a greater impact in certain factual scenarios. Two 
scenarios are explored below. 
a. Close Cases  
The first scenario is when the examiner and the applicant 
are at or near equipoise over patentability.199 To illustrate, sup-
pose that in 2007 an inventor develops a stainless steel dinner 
fork with five tines. Believing that the invention does a better 
job of spearing food and holding it in place than the traditional 
forks (with fewer tines), the inventor files a patent application 
later that year claiming the fork. Though multi-tined forks ex-
ist in the prior art, the claimed device is novel because it is not 
identically disclosed therein.200
Turning to nonobviousness, the examiner finds two prior 
art references from the same field of endeavor
  
201 which teach all 
of the limitations202 of the claimed device: a cutlery book pub-
lished in 1985 disclosing a four-tined stainless steel dinner fork 
and a merchandise catalog from 1939 disclosing a silver five-
tined serving fork. After making the factual findings set forth 
by the Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co.203 as to the 
scope and content of the prior art, the differences between the 
prior art and the claimed invention, and the PHOSITA’s level 
of skill,204
 
 199. In other words, having considered all of the evidence, the examiner 
concludes that it is equally likely that the invention is patentable or 
unpatentable. See Fleming James, Jr., Burdens of Proof, 47 VA. L. REV. 51, 
51–52 (1961) (discussing equipoise). 
 the examiner concludes that it would have been obvi-
 200. For a discussion of the novelty requirement, see supra note 160. 
 201. Nonobviousness is discussed supra note 161. Briefly, a reference quali-
fies as § 103(a) prior art if it is analogous to the field of invention. In re Kahn, 
441 F.3d 977, 986–87 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 
U.S. 1, 35 (1966)). References drawn from the same field of endeavor are con-
sidered analogous. Id. at 987. 
 202. A patent claim must define “the subject matter which the applicant 
regards as his invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 2 (2006). A claim element fur-
ther limits the breadth of the claim. 1 CHISUM, supra note 161, at Gl-3. In this 
illustration, “stainless steel,” “dinner,” and “five-tine[d]” are claim limitations. 
 203. 383 U.S. at 17. 
 204. Id.; see also discussion supra note 127. 
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ous for a PHOSITA at the time of the invention to produce the 
claimed device.  
The examiner supports this conclusion with two rationales. 
First, the examiner contends that a PHOSITA could have com-
bined the teachings of the two references in a predictable man-
ner205 to produce the claimed device with a reasonable expecta-
tion of success.206 Second, the examiner contends that the 
claimed invention was obvious to try because a PHOSITA seek-
ing to solve the problem articulated by the inventor would have 
been aware of a finite number of predictable solutions (adding 
tines) and thus would have had good reason to pursue and a 
reasonable expectation of successfully arriving at the claimed 
invention.207
Having made a prima facie case of obviousness,
  
208 the bur-
den of going forward shifts to the applicant.209 The applicant at-
tempts to rebut the prima facie case by arguing that the 
claimed device satisfies a long-felt but unresolved need in the 
art.210 The examiner responds with a request for actual proof;211 
specifically, “objective evidence that an art recognized problem 
existed in the art for a long period of time without solution.”212
 
 205. See MPEP, supra note 
 
Reminded that “the mere passage of time without the claimed 
56, § 2143(A) (noting that combining references 
according to known methods to produce a predictable result is an appropriate 
rationale to support a conclusion of obviousness); cf. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex 
Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007) (explaining that a combination of elements 
“must do more than yield a predictable result”). 
 206. See In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903–04 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Obvious-
ness does not require absolute predictability . . . . [A]ll that is required is a 
reasonable expectation of success.”); see also PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. 
v. ViaCell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342, 1360–64 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (reaffirming “reason-
able expectation of success” jurisprudence post-KSR). 
 207. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 421 (endorsing the “obvious to try” rationale); 
MPEP, supra note 56, § 2143(A) (same). 
 208. See In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (interpreting 
Graham v. John Deere to require the Patent Office to provide a factual basis 
for a § 103 rejection as a part of the prima facie case). 
 209. Id. 
 210. See supra note 127. 
 211. During the course of patent examination, the examiner may request 
“[t]echnical information known to [the] applicant concerning . . . the disclo-
sure, the claimed subject matter, other factual information pertinent to pat-
entability, or concerning the accuracy of the examiner’s stated interpretation 
of such items.” 37 C.F.R. § 1.105 (a)(1)(viii) (2012). 
 212. MPEP, supra note 56, § 716.04. In addition, “significant improvements 
in the art that bear on the inventor’s solution dilute the significance of prior 
need and failure.” 2 CHISUM, supra note 161, § 5.05[1]b. 
  
1026 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:990 
 
invention is not evidence of nonobviousness,”213 the applicant 
abandons this strategy and attempts to prove nonobviousness 
by showing praise for the invention by others in the art.214
Upon consideration of the entire record,
 The 
proffered evidence includes a copy of a short write-up about the 
invention in a cutlery trade publication and positive commen-
tary about it in Better Homes and Gardens magazine.  
215 the examiner 
finds that the nonobviousness issue is in equipoise. Under the 
current regime, equipoise means that “the applicant is entitled 
to the patent”216 absent any other grounds for unpatentability 
because “the applicant does not bear the ultimate burden of 
persuasion on the issue.”217
Denying patentability in this context makes sense from a 
technical standpoint and aligns with core goals of the patent 
system. Applying the proposed paradigm allows the 
nonobviousness requirement to truly fulfill its statutory pur-
pose: to prevent the issuance of patents for trivial extensions of 
what is already in the public domain.
 The proposed paradigm, on the oth-
er hand, would produce the opposite result thereby leaving the 
new fork unpatentable. 
218
 
 213. In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 991–92 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Iron Grip 
Barbell Co. v. USA Sports, Inc., 392 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
 It does so by targeting 
 214. The Federal Circuit has recognized praise as a secondary (objective) 
indicator of nonobviousness. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip 
Morris, Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Allen Archery, Inc. v. 
Browning Mfg. Co., 819 F.2d 1087, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (considering praise)); 
see also 2 CHISUM, supra note 161, § 5.05[4] (exploring the history of “reaction 
of experts in the field to the invention upon its initial public appearance” as 
objective evidence of nonobviousness). 
 215. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 216. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Plager, J., concur-
ring). 
 217. Id.; see also Kevin M. Clermont, Procedure’s Magical Number Three: 
Psychological Bases for Standards of Decision, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1115, 1119 
n.13 (1987) (“[T]he law handles a finding of equipoise by means of the burden 
of persuasion.”); James, supra note 199, at 51–52 (noting that in equipoise, the 
party that bears the risk of nonpersuasion loses). 
 218. See discussion supra note 127. By constitutional command, a patent 
can neither remove such knowledge from the public domain nor limit free ac-
cess to those materials already available. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 
1, 6 (1966); see also Kitch, Nature and Function, supra note 187, at 283 (argu-
ing that patents should not be granted for the use and development of known 
technical information because “proper incentives for its acquisition and use 
exist without a property right”). Rather, a patent can only be awarded for 
technical advances which add to the storehouse of useful knowledge. Graham, 
383 U.S. at 6 (“Innovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum of 
useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system which by consti-
tutional command must ‘promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts.’”); cf. Great 
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inventions that are sufficiently close to the prior art and within 
the PHOSITA’s technical grasp at the time the claimed inven-
tion is made.219 Thus, nonobviousness “creates a ‘patent-free’ 
zone around the state of the art,”220 allowing the PHOSITA to 
substitute materials, streamline processes, and “[to make] the 
usual marginal improvements which occur as a technology ma-
tures.”221
The nonobviousness requirement seeks to “weed[] out those 
inventions which would not be disclosed or devised but for the 
inducement of a patent.”
 
222 Here, modifying known devices (a 
four-tined stainless steel dinner fork and a five-tined serving 
fork) to produce a predictable, trivial modification (a stainless-
steel five-tined dinner fork) draws on knowledge already in the 
public domain and well within the PHOSITA’s skill and ordi-
nary creativity.223
 
Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152 (1950) 
(“The conjunction or concert of known elements must contribute something; 
only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumu-
lation of old devices patentable.”). As the Supreme Court recently explained: 
 Thus, (the inducement of) a patent is unnec-
We build and create by bringing to the tangible and palpable reality 
around us new works based on instinct, simple logic, ordinary infer-
ences, extraordinary ideas, and sometimes even genius. These ad-
vances, once part of our shared knowledge, define a new threshold 
from which innovation starts once more. And as progress beginning 
from higher levels of achievement is expected in the normal course, 
the results of ordinary innovation are not the subject of exclusive 
rights under the patent laws. Were it otherwise patents might stifle, 
rather than promote, the progress of useful arts.  
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007); cf. Edmund W. Kitch, 
Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for Patents, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 
293, 301 (explaining that nonobviousness is based on the principle that “a pat-
ent should not be granted for an innovation unless [it] would have been un-
likely to have been developed absent the prospect of a patent”). 
 219. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006); NARD, supra note 161, at 305 (discuss-
ing the nonobviousness requirement); cf. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1382 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (Rader, J., dissenting) (“The proper tool for assessing suffi-
cient contribution to the useful arts is the obviousness requirement of 35 
U.S.C. § 103.”). 
 220. MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 
288 (3d ed. 2009). 
 221. Id. 
 222. Graham, 383 U.S. at 11. 
 223. See Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 
60–62 (1969) (explaining that an invention derived from old elements which 
does no more than expected is obvious, despite being new and useful); cf. KSR, 
550 U.S. at 421, 427 (noting that the claimed design step was “well within the 
grasp” of a PHOSITA—a person of “ordinary skill in the relevant art”). Joseph 
Scott Miller elaborates: 
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essary since the fork came about through ordinary technologi-
cal progress.224
b. Challenging the Sufficiency of Disclosure  
  
The second scenario is when the sufficiency of the appli-
cant’s disclosure—and enablement in particular—is at issue. To 
illustrate, consider another hypothetical example. Suppose an 
inventor at a drug company seeks to patent a new class of 
pharmaceutical compounds. The patent application includes a 
generic claim that, by claiming a core chemical structure with 
an array of twenty variables appended to it, encompasses bil-
lions of compounds.225 As is typical in pharmaceutical cases, the 
claim is incredibly broad226
 
When a [PHOSITA] encounters a new problem, he or she will create a 
new ordinary invention—an obvious invention—as a matter of course. 
We do not need to provide a reward to draw into existence the obvious 
inventions that fall within the [PHOSITA’s] skill. The need to solve 
practical problems is sufficient to spark [their development], and 
their suitability for the needs they satisfy is itself a sufficient reward. 
—here because it is possible to sub-
stitute each of the twenty variables appended to the core struc-
Miller, supra note 161, at 2. 
 224. See supra note 218 and text accompanying note 220; Michael J. 
Meurer & Katherine J. Strandburg, Patent Carrots and Sticks: A Model of 
Nonobviousness, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 547, 549 (2008) (“The 
nonobviousness threshold may be used as a ‘stick’ to induce researchers to 
pursue more difficult, socially preferred research projects.”); Miller, supra note 
161, at 2 (“It is socially wasteful for us to pay a patent-backed premium for an 
innovation that we are almost certain to receive for free and just as early.”). 
 225. See In re Driscoll, 562 F.2d 1245, 1249 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (explaining 
that the practice of describing a class of chemical compounds in terms of struc-
tural formulas, where the substituents are recited in the claim language, has 
been sanctioned by the courts). This style of claiming—ubiquitous in the chem-
ical and pharmaceutical arts—is called Markush practice. See In re Harnisch, 
631 F.2d 716, 719–20 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (explaining the history and current law 
of Markush practice). For an example of this style of claiming, see U.S. Patent 
No. 4,801,613 (filed June 17, 1987). Claim 1 of the ’613 patent refers to “[a] 
modified bradykinin type peptide having the formula A-Arg-B-C-D-W-X-Y-Z-
Arg,” where the variables A, B, C, D, W, X, Y, Z are each generic substructures 
reciting smaller peptides or amino acids. Thus, the primary generic structure 
contains eight smaller generic substructures. See id. cols. 19–20, ll. 1–41. All 
together, this claim covers 10,235,904 formulations of a peptide. For an ex-
treme example, see U.S. Patent No. 5,422,351 (filed June 21, 1991) (including 
a structural formula in claim 1 which encompasses at least one novemdecillion 
(1060, or one followed by sixty zeroes) compounds). 
 226. See supra text accompanying note 67 (discussing “broad” claims); see 
also Ned A. Israelson & Rose M Thiessen, Chemical and Pharmaceutical Pat-
ents, in DRAFTING PATENTS FOR LITIGATION AND LICENSING 455, 457 (Bradley 
C. Wright ed., 2008) (advising drafters of chemical patent applications to pro-
vide adequate support for claims that often covers billions of species). 
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ture with countless organic functional groups.227
After construing the claims, assessing the PHOSITA’s level 
of skill, and evaluating the teaching provided in the patent ap-
plication,
 The patent ap-
plication, however, only sets forth five compounds actually 
made. These five compounds are closely related to each other in 
that the same variable (one of the twenty) is substituted in 
each.  
228
replacing a functional group on a chemical compound can often have 
highly unpredictable results. . . . [E]ven a change as seemingly trivial 
as replacing an isopropyl group with the isosteric cyclopropyl 
group . . . could result in either a significant improvement or reduc-
tion in the activity of the compound against a particular biological 
target.
 the examiner determines that the disclosure only 
teaches a PHOSITA how to make a narrower subgenus of five-
hundred compounds, not billions. As support for a prima facie 
case of nonenablement for the broad genus, the examiner rec-
ognizes that 
229
The point here is that a PHOSITA cannot extrapolate a result 
from a few embodiments across a broad genus with a reasona-
ble expectation of success.
 
230
 
 227. A functional group is a group of atoms within a molecule with specific 
chemical properties that represents a potential reaction site in a compound, 
and thus determines a molecule’s chemical reactivity. See generally RICHARD 
C. LAROCK, COMPREHENSIVE ORGANIC TRANSFORMATIONS (2d ed. 1999) 
(providing a comprehensive list of functional group preparations). 
  
 228. See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text (discussing the factual 
inquiries underlying the enablement analysis). 
 229. Singh v. Brake, 317 F.3d 1334, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citation omit-
ted); see also Yasuko Kawai v. Metlesics, 480 F.2d 880, 891 (C.C.P.A. 1973) 
(explaining that with respect to the enablement of a method-of-treatment 
claim, a PHOSITA “is well aware that subtle changes in chemical compounds 
can radically alter the effects on a human body”). 
 230. In fields like chemistry, results are often unpredictable because re-
searchers often must engage in trial and error to figure out what works and 
what does not. Thus, a PHOSITA cannot predict if a reaction protocol which 
works for one compound will work for others. See Cedarapids, Inc. v. Nord-
berg, Inc., No. 95-1529, 1997 WL 452801, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 11, 1997) (ex-
plaining that in the chemical arts, “a slight variation . . . can yield an unpre-
dictable result or may not work at all”); In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1564 
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (testing enablement by determining if a skilled scientist would 
have believed reasonably that the inventor's success with the described em-
bodiment(s) “could be extrapolated with a reasonable expectation of success” to 
other embodiments encompassed by the broad claims); In re Prutton, 200 F.2d 
706, 712 (C.C.P.A. 1952) (holding that claims to a class of chemical com-
pounds, which were sufficiently broad to involve some speculation, lack ena-
blement, notwithstanding the presence of the operative specific examples 
within the class); Karen S. Canady, The Wright Enabling Disclosure for Bio-
technology Patents, 69 WASH. L. REV. 455, 458 (1994). 
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Consequently, the examiner rejects the broad generic claim 
as prima facie nonenabled because a PHOSITA would have to 
engage in undue experimentation to practice its full scope.231 At 
this point the burden shifts to the applicant to establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the PHOSITA’s knowledge 
in combination with the applicant’s teaching can actually ena-
ble the full scope of the generic claim. In response, the appli-
cant argues that a well-trained organic chemist would know 
where to look in the scientific literature to fill in the technical 
gaps.232 The examiner determines that the proffered evidence is 
insufficient to rebut the prima facie case because it is not a 
“persuasive argument[], supported by suitable [evidence] where 
necessary, that [a PHOSITA] would be able to make and use 
the claimed invention using the application as a guide.”233
At this point, examination could take two paths. Consider 
first the scenario in which the applicant is unable or unwilling 
to produce the requisite evidence. Mindful of the presumption 
of unpatentability, the applicant voluntarily cancels the broad 
generic claim and pursues the narrower subgenus claim cover-
ing five-hundred compounds. The examiner allows that claim 
and the applicant ultimately obtains a much narrower patent—
by eight orders of magnitude—than that which probably would 
have issued under the current regime. 
  
 
 231. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 148, at 848 (explaining why such a 
rejection is proper). There is a danger that embodiments not described either 
cannot be made or may require experimentation which is unduly extensive. 
See PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 75 F.3d 1558, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 
1996) (explaining that “[e]nablement is lacking . . . because the undescribed 
embodiments cannot be made, based on the disclosure . . . without undue ex-
perimentation”). 
 232. Applicants often point to the oft-cited statement that “a patent need 
not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art.” Hybritech Inc. 
v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also 
Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(explaining that the written description need not necessarily describe how to 
make and use every embodiment of the invention because the PHOSITA’s 
“knowledge of the prior art and routine experimentation can often fill in the 
gaps” (quoting AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003))). 
However, “that general, oft-repeated statement is merely a rule of supplemen-
tation, not a substitute for a basic enabling disclosure.” Genentech, Inc. v. No-
vo Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cited with approval in 
ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharms., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 940–41 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  
 233. MPEP, supra note 56, § 2164.05; see also In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 
220, 223 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (explaining that a “rejection for failure to teach . . . 
can be overcome by suitable proofs indicating that the teaching contained in 
the specification is truly enabling”).  
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Now consider a scenario in which the applicant adduces 
additional proof of patentability—most likely experimental de-
tails for more of the claimed compounds. As far as the burden is 
concerned, the additional technical information would provide 
more enablement and allow the applicant to obtain a patent 
with claims covering more than five-hundred compounds (but 
still narrower than what was originally sought).  
In this latter scenario, the proposed regime would allow 
the applicant to amend the patent document to include this ad-
ditional technical information. This would probably require the 
Federal Circuit and the Patent Office to liberalize the “new 
matter” doctrine which severely restricts the ability of appli-
cants to amend patent documents.234 The key question is 
whether the additional technical information “was inherently 
contained in the original application”235—a fact-based inquiry 
which depends on “the nature of the disclosure, the state of the 
art, and the nature of the added matter.”236
B. NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS 
 If the examiner 
makes a positive finding, the additional technical information 
would be incorporated into the issued patent. Thus, the result-
ing patent document would be more technically robust than the 
one originally filed. 
1. Retention of the Prima Facie Case 
Recall that under the current regime, the examiner bears 
the burden of establishing a prima facie case of 
unpatentability.237
 
 234. When an applicant amends the written description, the Patent Office 
instructs examiners to be on the alert for “new matter.” See 35 U.S.C. § 132(a) 
(2006) (“No amendment shall introduce new matter into the disclosure of the 
invention.”); 37 C.F.R. § 1.121 (2012); MPEP, supra note 
 Once established, the burden of production 
shifts to the applicant to rebut the inference of unpatentability 
56, § 706.03(o) (alert-
ing examiners). “The written description requirement [of 35 U.S.C. § 112] and 
its corollary, the new matter prohibition of 35 U.S.C. § 132, both serve to en-
sure that the patent applicant was in full possession of the claimed subject 
matter on the application filing date.” TurboCare Div. of Demag Delaval 
Turbomachinery Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 264 F.3d 1111, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  
 235. TurboCare, 264 F.3d at 1118 (quoting Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 
222 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).  
 236. Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1574 
(Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 237. See sources cited supra notes 45–49 and accompanying text. A prima 
facie case suffices as proof of a particular fact or issue “unless disproved or re-
butted.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1310 (9th ed. 2009). 
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by a preponderance of the evidence.238 If sufficient rebuttal evi-
dence is produced, the inference “is dissipated”239 and the exam-
iner must consider all of the facts in evidence—including those 
adduced during later stages of prosecution—before drawing a 
final conclusion as to patentability.240 On the other hand, insuf-
ficient rebuttal evidence compels a conclusion of 
unpatentability.241
The prima facie case is retained as a procedural device in 
the proposed framework for several reasons. First, in ex parte 
matters, it serves as an orderly mechanism for initially produc-
ing evidence,
 
242 and it “promotes the development of the written 
record”243
[I]ts purpose is simply to provide sufficient notice to the applicant to 
facilitate his effective submission of information. Since the applicant 
is in the best position to cheaply provide information about the pur-
ported invention, the PTO’s authority to shift the burden to obtain 
this information [after the prima facie case it met] is crucial to ensure 
that the PTO is not mak[ing] patentability determinations on insuffi-
cient facts and information.
 of the proceedings before the Patent Office. The Fed-
eral Circuit has defended the prima facie case precisely because 
of this information-gathering function: 
244
Second, without the prima facie case, an applicant would 
be hard-pressed to figure out why the invention is 
unpatentable. It would make little sense for the examiner “[to] 
 
 
 238. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Piasecki, 745 
F.2d 1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 239. Piasecki, 745 F.2d at 1472; see also In re Kumar, 418 F.3d 1361, 1366 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (“When rebuttal evidence is provided, the prima facie case dis-
solves, and the decision is made on the entirety of the evidence.”); Oetiker, 977 
F.2d at 1445 (“The term ‘prima facie case’ refers only to the initial examina-
tion step.”); cf. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 30, § 2491, at 305 (explain-
ing that a presumption disappears when sufficient evidence is introduced to 
rebut it). 
 240. See Oetiker, 977 F.2d at 1445 (“[T]he ultimate determination of pa-
tentability is made on the entire record.”); Piasecki, 745 F.2d at 1472 (noting 
that once the prima facie inference is rebutted, “the examiner must consider 
all of the evidence anew”); In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048, 1052 (C.C.P.A. 1976) 
(warning examiners not to become analytically fixated on the prima facie case 
or “to provide that decision with an undeservedly broadened umbrella effect”). 
 241. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EV-
IDENCE § 3:6 (3d ed. 2007) (describing the function of the presumptions). 
 242. See Piasecki, 745 F.2d at 1472; see also In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 710 
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (“[T]he principle underlying orderly patent examination is 
that the burden in the first instance is on the examiner to establish that the 
claimed invention is prima facie unpatentable . . . .”). 
 243. In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 244. Hyatt v. Dudas, 492 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (internal quota-
tions omitted). 
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sit mum, leaving the applicant to shoot arrows into the dark 
hoping to somehow hit a secret objection harbored by the exam-
iner.”245 Finally, the prima facie case mitigates arbitrariness to 
the extent that it prevents the Patent Office from denying pat-
ents without a sufficient factual basis.246
2. Reallocation of the Burden of Persuasion 
 
The principal significance of the burden of persuasion is to 
determine, upon consideration of all of the evidence, which par-
ty wins if the decisionmaker is in doubt.247 Where the burden 
rests can depend upon the existence of a presumption since the 
latter can assign the former.248 This is the case in patent law 
because assigning the burden to the Patent Office stems from 
the presumption of patentability.249
 
 245. Oetiker, 977 F.2d at 1449 (Plager, J., concurring). 
 Since the proposed frame-
 246. As Judge Plager once explained: 
  The “prima facie case” notion . . . seemingly was intended to leave 
no doubt among examiners that they must state clearly and specifi-
cally any objections (the prima facie case) to patentability, and give 
the applicant fair opportunity to meet those objections with evidence 
and argument. To that extent the concept serves to level the playing 
field and reduces the likelihood of administrative arbitrariness. 
Id. (citation omitted); see also supra Part I.C (arguing that the current pre-
sumption of patentability is justified in part by the fear of Patent Office arbi-
trariness). 
 247. 2 KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 336, at 472 
(6th ed. 2006) [hereinafter MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE]; James, supra note 199, 
at 51–52 (noting that in equipoise, the party that bears the risk of 
nonpersuasion loses); Chris William Sanchirico, A Primary-Activity Approach 
to Proof Burdens, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 273, 273–74 (2008) (“The party bearing 
the burden of persuasion loses if the totality of both parties’ evidence leaves 
the fact finder in equipoise regarding who should prevail.”). 
 248. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 247, § 343, at 500 (“A pre-
sumption shifts the burden of producing evidence and may assign the burden 
of persuasion as well.”); Ronald J. Allen, Presumptions in Civil Actions Recon-
sidered, 66 IOWA L. REV. 843, 845 (1981) (noting that presumptions have been 
used to allocate the burden of persuasion); Kenneth S. Broun, The Unfulfilla-
ble Promise of One Rule for All Presumptions, 62 N.C. L. REV. 697, 701 (1984) 
(same). Presumptions themselves are often “created by courts and by legisla-
tures to accomplish various objectives or policies.” Mason Ladd, Presumptions 
in Civil Actions, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275, 279. Thus, creating a presumption 
which allocates the burden of persuasion allows the courts and legislatures to 
essentially choose the preferred result in close cases. See Paul H. Robinson, 
Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 257 
n.215 (1982). 
 249. See, e.g., In re Epstein, 32 F.3d 1559, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Plager, J., 
concurring); Oetiker, 977 F.2d at 1449; In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1016 
(C.C.P.A. 1967). 
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work flips the presumption to one of unpatentability,250
This reallocation is consistent with the scholarly literature 
on evidence. At first glance this might seem surprising because 
the burden of persuasion often rests with the same party that 
carries the initial burden of production.
 it logi-
cally reallocates the burden of persuasion to the applicant.  
251 Yet this is not a 
hard-and-fast rule. Evidence scholars have long urged that 
there is no single overarching principle which dictates how the 
burden of persuasion should be assigned.252 Rather, it may de-
pend upon a myriad of factors.253 Two common factors—both of 
which are relevant for patent examination—are access to proof 
and substantive policy considerations.254
A doctrine has emerged which assigns the burden of per-
suasion to a party if it has superior information needed to prove 
an issue, even if that party does not bear the initial burden of 
producing evidence.
  
255
 
 250. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 The Supreme Court recognizes and ap-
 251. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 247, § 337, at 477 (recog-
nizing that the two burdens generally rest with the same party); MUELLER & 
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 241, § 3:3 (same); 21B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & 
KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE 
§ 5122, at 401 (2d ed. 2005) (“[T]he same party who has the burden of persua-
sion also starts out with the burden of producing evidence . . . .”). 
 252. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 247, § 337, at 477; see also 
James, supra note 199, at 62 (“[T]he production burden and the persuasion 
burden [do] not always march hand in hand.” (citing JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, 
A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 370–78 (1898))).  
 253. See, e.g., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 247, § 337, at 477 (ex-
plaining that the allocation “will depend upon the weight that is given to any 
one or more of several factors, including: (1) the natural tendency to place the 
burdens on the party desiring change, (2) special policy considerations such as 
those disfavoring certain defenses, (3) convenience, (4) fairness, and (5) the 
judicial estimate of the probabilities”); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 
241, § 3:3 (listing five factors: custom, substantive policy, access to proof, 
probable truth, and proof unavailable); WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 251, 
§ 5122, at 401–02 (discussing “disturb[ing] the status quo” and “[t]he Three 
Ps—Policy, Probability, and Possession of Proof”); Lakin v. Watkins Associated 
Indus., 863 P.2d 179, 189 (Cal. 1993) (“In determining whether the normal al-
location of the burden of proof should be altered, the courts consider a number 
of factors: the knowledge of the parties concerning the particular fact, the 
availability of the evidence to the parties, the most desirable result in terms of 
public policy in the absence of proof of the particular fact, and the probability 
of the existence or nonexistence of the fact.” (quoting CAL. EVID. CODE § 500 
cmt. at 431 (West 1966)).  
 254. See sources cited supra note 253. 
 255. See JOHN MACARTHUR MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE: COMMON SENSE AND 
COMMON LAW 179 (1947) (asserting that the burden of persuasion “is to be 
borne by the party having peculiar knowledge of the facts”); MCCORMICK ON 
EVIDENCE, supra note 247, § 337, at 475 (“A doctrine often repeated by the 
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plies this doctrine because “considerations of fairness” require 
allocation to a party if the facts needed to establish an issue lie 
“peculiarly within [that party’s] knowledge.”256 Several com-
mentators have argued that this doctrine also makes sense 
from an economic perspective.257
In the patent examination context, it is the applicant who 
has superior information about the invention.
  
258 But applicants 
may be reluctant to share all of this information with the exam-
iner. As Professor Timothy Holbrook has explained, “applicants 
do have incentives to withhold certain information and behave 
strategically, in part due to concerns over competition and in 
part due to concerns over the legal consequences their disclo-
sures may create.”259
 
courts is that where the facts with regard to an issue lie peculiarly in the 
knowledge of a party, that party has the burden of proving the issue.”); 
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 
 This is why the Patent Office must im-
241, § 3:3 (discussing access to proof); 
Ronald J. Allen, Presumptions, Inferences and Burden of Proof in Federal Civil 
Actions—An Anatomy of Unnecessary Ambiguity and a Proposal for Reform, 76 
NW. U. L. REV. 892, 899 (1982) (noting that the burden of persuasion is fre-
quently allocated to the party on issues peculiarly within the knowledge of 
that party). 
 256. United States v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 355 U.S. 253, 
256 n.5 (1957) (“The ordinary rule, based on considerations of fairness, does 
not place the burden upon a litigant of establishing facts peculiarly within the 
knowledge of his adversary.”); see Allseas Maritime, S.A. v. M/V Mimosa, 812 
F.2d 243, 248 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating an exception to a party’s burden of per-
suasion “when the facts with regard to an issue lie peculiarly in the knowledge 
of one party, and it would therefore be particularly onerous to require the oth-
er party to bear the burden of persuasion on the issue” (internal quotations 
omitted)); see also WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 30, § 2486, at 291 (not-
ing “peculiar means of knowledge” as a factor to consider in assigning the bur-
den). 
 257. See Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Burdens of Proof in Civil Liti-
gation: An Economic Perspective, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 413, 419 (1997) (“One par-
ty may have easier access to evidence than his opponent, meaning he can as-
semble the appropriate evidence at lower cost than his opponent. Other things 
being equal, the lower one party’s relative costs, the stronger the argument for 
giving him the burden of proof.”). A similar argument can be made for a party 
that has greater resources. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to 
the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1543 (1999) (arguing that burdens 
of production and persuasion are economizing devices and should therefore be 
assigned to the party with greatest access to resources). 
 258. See supra notes 132, 136, 181 and accompanying text. 
 259. Holbrook, supra note 138, at 818. With regard to competition, “patent 
applicants have the incentive to disclose ‘just enough’ to satisfy the patentabil-
ity requirements of § 112 while retaining other aspects as trade secrets.” Id. 
(citing R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administration and the 
Failure of Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 214–16 (2002)). Regarding legal con-
sequences, “the Federal Circuit’s treatment of the patent document gives an 
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plement rules to compel disclosure in order to help minimize its 
information deficit.260 In addition, commentators have argued 
that the Patent Office’s limited resources hinder its ability to 
acquire all of the information that it needs to conduct robust 
examinations.261 On the other hand, the applicant is often the 
“cheapest cost provider”262 vis-à-vis the Patent Office when it 
comes to furnishing information for patent examination.263
Another important factor for allocating the burden of per-
suasion is the policy goal of the underlying substantive law.
 For 
these reasons, the superior information doctrine should be con-
sidered as a factor in reallocating the burden of persuasion to 
the applicant. 
264 
Some commentators suggest that this may be the most im-
portant factor.265 Absent clear direction from Congress, the fed-
eral courts are not hesitant to allocate the burden in a manner 
consistent with their perceptions of good policy.266 Importantly 
for present purposes, sometimes this policy choice is supported 
or reinforced with a presumption.267 A good example comes from 
the common law of admiralty. In cases where a vessel hits a 
stationary object, a rebuttable presumption of fault arises and 
the burden of persuasion rests with the alliding vessel.268 This 
rule furthers the policy goal of avoiding maritime accidents.269
 
incentive for patent applicants to limit their disclosures to avoid potential es-
toppel-like consequences.” Id. 
  
 260. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
 261. See supra note 28, infra notes 285, 295 and accompanying text. 
 262. Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Commentary, Toward a System 
of Invention Registration: The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 110 MICH. L. 
REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 24, 29 (2011), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/ 
assets/fi/110/rantanenpetherbridge.pdf. 
 263. Id. at 28 (“[W]here the cost of having the patent applicant provide in-
formation is relatively low, and particularly where the cost to the patent office 
of providing information is prohibitively high, the law allocates the cost of the 
information to the party seeking the exclusive rights.”). 
 264. See WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 30, § 2486, at 291 (explaining 
that allocating the burden of persuasion can be “merely a question of policy 
and fairness”); James, supra note 199, at 61 (noting that substantive policy 
considerations may be influential). 
 265. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 241, § 3:3 (“First and per-
haps most important, burdens are allocated to serve substantive policy . . . .”); 
see also WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 251, § 5122, at 402 (“In determining 
the placement of burdens of proof, courts begin with the policy of the substan-
tive law . . . .”). 
 266. See Allen, supra note 255, at 898. 
 267. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 251, § 5122, at 400. 
 268. See The Oregon, 158 U.S. 186, 192–93 (1895) (holding that a vessel 
moving under its own power that allides with a stationary object is presumed 
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The same rationale extends by analogy to the patent law 
context. As discussed in the next section, allocating the burden 
of persuasion to the applicant in combination with a presump-
tion of unpatentability could be used to modulate applicant be-
havior and further certain policy objectives of the patent sys-
tem.270
3. Allowing Post-Filing Amendments to Patent Documents 
  
The proposal contemplates that inventors who are able to 
adduce proof of patentability will seek to incorporate the addi-
tional information into the patent document.271 Allowing a post-
filing amendment to the disclosure would yield an issued pa-
tent which would be more technically robust than what was 
originally filed. Nevertheless, one might ask if liberalizing the 
new matter doctrine would unfairly give an applicant a “second 
bite at the apple” with respect to compliance with § 112.272 Pos-
sibly, but this prong of the proposal is designed to strike a bal-
ance between an inventor’s need to file early273 and a broader 
interest in using disclosure to promote the patent system’s 
overarching goal of scientific and technological progress.274 Fi-
nally, it is worth reiterating that allowing the post-filing 
amendments would still yield claims in the issued patent which 
would be narrower than those likely to issue under the current 
regime.275
 
to be at fault and has the burden of persuasion to prove otherwise); The Loui-
siana, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 164, 173 (1865) (holding that a drifting vessel that 
allides with a stationary object is presumed to be at fault and has the burden 
of persuasion to prove otherwise). These drifting-vessel rules essentially apply 
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to admiralty cases. See Rodi Yachts, Inc. v. Nat’l 
Marine, Inc., 984 F.2d 880, 886 (7th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). 
  
 269. See Hood v. Knappton Corp., 986 F.2d 329, 331 (9th Cir. 1993) (dis-
cussing the policy goals of The Louisiana rule). 
 270. See infra Part III.C. 
 271. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 272. See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 977 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (“Every patent system must have some provision to prevent applicants 
from using the amendment process to update their disclosures (claims or spec-
ifications) during their pendency before the patent office. Otherwise applicants 
could add new matter to their disclosures and date them back to their original 
filing date, thus defeating an accurate accounting of the priority of inven-
tion.”); In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 604 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (explaining that com-
pliance with enablement is gauged as of the applicant’s effective filing date). 
 273. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 274. See supra Part II.B. 
 275. Enablement places an outer limit on the scope of the claims. See Nat’l 
Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196 
(Fed. Cir. 1999). As discussed in the main text, under the current regime the 
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C. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
1. Patent (Examination) Quality 
There is a general consensus that an important policy goal 
for patent law is to improve patent quality.276 An overarching 
objective of quality improvement efforts is to reduce uncertain-
ty throughout the patent system.277 In theory, high patent qual-
ity would lead to less “uncertainty about the validity of granted 
patents, uncertainty about the scope of granted patents, uncer-
tainty about whether a particular invention is patentable, and 
uncertainty about whether a valid patent will be fully en-
forced.”278
Increased certainty would discourage opportunistic behav-
ior such as rent-seeking patent acquisition and enforcement ac-
tivities;
  
279
 
presumption of enablement tips the scales toward the issuance of a patent 
with broad claims. See supra notes 
 lower the overall amount, expense, and complexity of 
176–95 and accompanying text; e.g., supra 
text accompanying notes 59–85 (providing a hypothetical example). Clearly 
the proposed presumption of unpatentability and reallocated burdens of proof 
would constrain claim scope, but exactly how much would depend on the na-
ture and amount of proof adduced by the applicant. See supra Part III.A.2.b. 
 276. Jaffe, supra note 20, at 65. 
 277. For a description of some of the detrimental effects of uncertainty, see 
FTC REPORT, supra note 8, ch. 3, at 53–55 (explaining how low-quality patents 
create uncertainty and hinder innovation); Note, Estopping the Madness at the 
PTO: Improving Patent Administration Through Prosecution History Estoppel, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 2164, 2165 (2003) (“[P]oor patent quality creates uncertain-
ty over patent validity. This uncertainty increases transaction costs in licens-
ing negotiations because parties must conduct duplicative research and prior 
art searches to determine if a particular patent is valid and worth licensing. 
Finally, by postponing the true validity determination until litigation, poor 
patent quality strains judicial resources.”). Reducing uncertainty is a persis-
tent concern in patent law. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 
U.S. 364, 369 (1938) (indicating that the primary purpose of notice is “to guard 
against unreasonable advantages to the patentee and disadvantages to others 
arising from uncertainty as to their [respective] rights”); see also Christianson 
v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 813 (1988) (recognizing that one 
of Congress’s goals in creating the Federal Circuit was to reduce uncertainty 
in the application of patent law); In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 322 (Fed. Cir. 1989) 
(“An essential purpose of patent examination is to fashion claims that are pre-
cise, clear, correct, and unambiguous. Only in this way can uncertainties of 
claim scope be removed, as much as possible, during the administrative pro-
cess.”). 
 278. Wagner, supra note 3, at 2140. 
 279. See Thomas, Patent Administration Reform, supra note 10, at 731 (ar-
guing that poor patent quality allows contracting parties to review patents to 
asses and challenge their validity). “Rent seeking behavior may arise when the 
holder of a poor quality patent seeks to enforce exclusionary rights that are 
probably invalid or seeks to stretch a valid narrow exclusionary right to cover 
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patent infringement litigation;280 and “strengthen the incen-
tives of private actors to engage in value-maximizing activities 
such as innovation or commercial transactions.”281
The quality of an issued patent depends on the quality of 
the underlying Patent Office examination.
 
282 To a large extent 
the assurance of a good Patent Office examination is all about 
information.283 It is doubtful that other patent reform efforts 
will significantly improve patent quality unless and until some-
thing is done about the information deficit at the Patent Of-
fice.284 To explain, it should be clear that an examiner must 
have all of the relevant technical information in hand in order 
to accurately gauge patentability. But the Patent Office’s lim-
ited resources,285 combined with examiner production goals286
 
acts outside the proper scope of the patent.” Scott R. Boalick, Patent Quality 
and the Dedication Rule, 11 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 215, 240 (2004) (citing Michael 
J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual Proper-
ty Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 512–16 (2003)); see also Wagner, supra note 
 
3, at 2144 (explaining that the uncertainty brought about by a low-quality pat-
ent system allows it “[to] be exploited—whether by filing low-probability, high-
cost suits or by seeking large numbers of low-quality patents to use as lever-
age for settlement”). 
 280. Wagner, supra note 3, at 2144. 
 281. Wendy Schacht & John R. Thomas, Patent Reform: Innovation Issues, 
in PATENT TECHNOLOGY 1, 6 (Juanita M. Branes ed., 2007); see also Qin Shi, 
Patent System Meets New Sciences: Is the Law Responsive to Changing Tech-
nologies and Industries?, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 317, 334–35 (2005) (ex-
plaining how patents of questionable quality can create ambiguities and un-
certainties in the scope of ownership rights which can burden intellectual 
property transactions and thereby impede commercialization). 
 282. FTC REPORT, supra note 8, ch. 1, at 19 (citing ADVISORY COMM. ON 
INDUS. INNOVATION, INDUS. ADVISORY SUBCOMM. ON PATENT & INFO. POLICY, 
REPORT ON PATENT POLICY 153–55 (1979)). 
 283. See id. (arguing that the search for prior art is key to a quality patent 
and advocating for more resources to improve examination procedures); 
Cotropia, Inequitable Conduct, supra note 26, at 748 (“The assurance of a good 
patent quality is all about information . . . .”). 
 284. See supra Part I.C.1. For a proposal which seeks to mitigate the Pat-
ent Office’s information deficit, see Sean B. Seymore, The Null Patent, 53 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 2041, 2041–42 (2012) (proposing a new medium of disclosure 
which would both provide examiners with more information and serve the 
public good by enriching the public storehouse of knowledge). 
 285. For example, an examiner’s ability to get the relevant technical infor-
mation is subject to the Patent Office’s infrastructural limitations. See John R. 
Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United States Pat-
ent System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 102 (2002) (“The predominance of U.S. patents 
[as cited prior art] may . . . reflect the limitations of the PTO systems for 
searching: the PTO is much more likely to find documents that it itself has 
generated.”); Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 11, at 1500 (“[M]uch of 
the most relevant prior art isn’t easy to find—it consists of [third-party activi-
ties] that don’t show up in any searchable database and will not be found by 
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and time pressures,287 prevent this from happening. Indeed, for 
many inventions no one believes that the information that the 
examiner uncovers in the search of the prior art (for assessing 
novelty and nonobviousness) sufficiently represents the body of 
preexisting knowledge.288 And notwithstanding the applicant’s 
duty of candor,289 it is hard to realistically believe that every-
thing that the applicant knows about the invention ends up be-
fore the examiner.290 When the examiner lacks the requisite 
technical information to gauge patentability, it is likely that 
low-quality patents will issue.291
The proposed regime helps ameliorate the information def-
icit. While it would not relieve the examiner of the burden of 
compiling sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of 
 
 
examiners in a hurry.”); Michael Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent 
Prosecution, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 179, 196 (2007) (“A high-quality prior art 
search is difficult because of resource and time limitations.”); Thomas, Collu-
sion, supra note 2, at 318–19 (explaining that in newer technologies, examin-
ers often cannot obtain the most recent technical literature); Bhaven N. 
Sampat, Determinants of Patent Quality: An Empirical Analysis 3 (Sept. 
2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.immagic.com/ 
eLibrary/ARCHIVES/GENERAL/COLUMBIA/C050902S.pdf (finding that ex-
aminers are less likely to find non-patent prior art and foreign patents). 
 286. “Production goals are the number of specific actions and decisions that 
patent examiners must make about patent applications they review during a 
two-week period.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-1102, U.S. 
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE: HIRING EFFORTS ARE NOT SUFFICIENT TO 
REDUCE THE PATENT APPLICATION BACKLOG 2 (2007), available at http://www 
.gao.gov/new.items/d071102.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2012). Implicit in these 
goals is an estimate of the time it takes to review a patent application. See id. 
at 7. 
 287. The amount of time the Patent Office allots for an examiner to dispose 
of a case depends on factors like seniority and the technology involved. See id. 
Time estimates vary. Compare Thomas, Collusion, supra note 2, at 314 (esti-
mating a sixteen- to seventeen-hour average time allotment), with Lemley, 
Rational Ignorance, supra note 11, at 1500 n.19 (aggregating time estimates, 
which range from eight to thirty-two hours, depending on the industry). As a 
part of internal patent reform, the Patent Office has reevaluated examination 
timelines. See supra note 27. 
 288. See supra note 285. This is particularly problematic in nascent, rapid-
ly changing, or highly specialized fields where there is a paucity of relevant 
patent literature. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 21, at 51 (explaining that while 
the Patent Office’s accessible information sources might be sufficient to gauge 
patentability for mechanical and chemical fields, this may not be true in fields 
like software where the relevant information is inaccessible to the Patent Of-
fice). 
 289. See supra note 131 (discussing 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2012)).  
 290. See supra notes 129–31, 285 and accompanying text. 
 291. See sources cited supra notes 283–84 and accompanying text. 
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patentability,292 placing the burden of persuasion on the appli-
cant combined with the presumption of unpatentability would 
compel the applicant (rather than the examiner) to furnish in-
formation in close cases to carry the burden of proof and ulti-
mately prevail.293 If the applicant could not do so, a patent 
would not issue—which is not necessarily a bad outcome.294
But it is important to reiterate that the proposal would not 
place additional burdens on the examiner or the Patent Office. 
This is very important given the Patent Office’s chronic funding 
concerns
 On 
the other hand, if a patent issues, it would be of higher quality 
vis-à-vis one issuing under the current regime because the ap-
plication would have been subjected to a more robust examina-
tion.  
295 and infrastructural limitations.296 The proposal ac-
cepts the idea that “[i]mproving examination efficiency and pa-
tent quality should be a ‘mutually shared responsibility’ of both 
the PTO and patent applicants.”297
 
 292. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 Thus, modifying the eviden-
tiary rules of patent examination to be more evenly balanced 
 293. See supra Part III.A. 
 294. See infra notes 303–06 and accompanying text. 
 295. The Patent Office’s current resource problems might stem in part from 
a time in the recent past when some of the fee revenue it generated was di-
verted to the general treasury of the United States for use by other agencies. 
See Figueroa v. United States, 466 F.3d 1023, 1026–29 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(providing a historical account and reporting a Patent Office surplus of $545.1 
million from fiscal years 1991 to 2004). At the end of fiscal year 2010, 
$814,759,000 in collected fees in the Patent Office’s treasury account were 
“unavailable” to the agency. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFOR-
MANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 74 (2010) (dis-
cussing funding limitations). But see Mark A. Lemley, Can the Patent Office Be 
Fixed?, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 295, 298–99 (2011) (arguing that few-
er issued patents resulted in fewer maintenance fees and led to the Patent Of-
fice’s problems in the late 2000s).  
 296. See supra note 285. 
 297. Brian E. Mack, Note, PTO Rulemaking in the Twenty-First Century: 
Defining the Line Between Strategic Planning and Abuse of Authority, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2105, 2151 (2007) (quoting Letter from Rick D. Nydegger, 
Chair, Patent Pub. Advisory Comm. of the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, to 
Honorable Jon Dudas, Under Sec’y of Commerce for Intellectual Prop. 1 (May 
3, 2006), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/ 
comments/fpp_continuation/ppac.pdf); see also Steve Lohr, U.S. Seeking Strict-
er Rules on Qualifying for a Patent, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2007, at C3 (quoting 
Jon Dudas, then Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 
as stating: “There ought to be a shared responsibility for patent quality among 
the patent office, the applicants and the public . . . . If everything is done right 
at the front end, we’ll have to worry a lot less about litigation later.”). 
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between the examiner and the applicant comports with existing 
patent policy and is worthy of consideration.298
2. Filing Behavior 
 
There is no doubt that the proposed regime would affect fil-
ing behavior. Faced with the presumption of unpatentability 
and the possible need to adduce proof, inventors with trivial or 
underdeveloped inventions contemplating a patent might real-
ize that pursuing one would be a waste of time and money.299 
This would leave the inventor with two options. The first option 
would be not to file at all. Further product development might 
reveal, for example, that the invention would be technically in-
feasible or unlikely to gain much attention in the market-
place.300 The inventor could conclude that the potential value of 
a conceived idea is not great enough to justify the expense of 
adducing sufficient proof for an inevitable fight over patentabil-
ity.301 For the patent system the upsides are many: one less ap-
plication to be examined (and thus one less application to 
strain Patent Office resources and exacerbate the application 
overload problem),302 the derailment of an assuredly low-quality 
patent,303 one less obstacle for other inventors,304 and one less 
patent document whose disclosure would add nothing to the 
public storehouse of technical knowledge.305 So forgoing a pa-
tent in this context is not a bad result.306
 
 298. See Patent Quality Improvement, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, the Internet, & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
108th Cong. 24 (2003) (statement of John R. Thomas, Professor of Law, 
Georgetown University) (arguing that “the imposition of modest increases in 
the responsibilities of patent applicants,” such as asking them to perform a 
prior art search, “strikes many observers as a sound policy choice,” “comports 
with existing patent policies,” and is “worthy of extended consideration”). 
  
 299. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 2, at 175. 
 300. Cotropia, Early Filing, supra note 175, at 88–93. Of course, an inven-
tion which is technically infeasible probably has little market worth. Id. at 
123. 
 301. Cf. id. at 124 (using similar language in the context of an actual re-
duction to practice requirement). This scenario is one in which “some ideas 
will simply not make it.” Id. 
 302. Id. at 104–05; see also supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 303. Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, The Political Economy of the Patent 
System, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1341, 1369 (2009) (“Higher quality patents mean that 
fewer patents will be granted.”). 
 304. See Cecil D. Quillen, Jr., Innovation and the U.S. Patent System, 1 VA. 
L. & BUS. REV. 207, 210 (2006) (discussing patent obstacles).  
 305. Cf. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (explain-
ing that when the information disclosed in a patent becomes publicly available 
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The second option is to postpone filing until the invention 
is “further down the technology path.”307 Indeed, patent law 
contemplates that the inventor might spend some time perfect-
ing the invention before filing.308 From a policy perspective 
much good can come from the former; including better inven-
tions,309 more efficient patent examination,310 improved patent 
quality,311 reduced uncertainty,312 and better disclosure.313
 
it adds to the “general store of knowledge” and assumedly will stimulate ideas 
and promote technological development); In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390, 
1394 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (Baldwin, J., concurring) (noting that the full and com-
plete disclosure of how to make and use the claimed invention “adds a meas-
ure of worthwhile knowledge to the public storehouse”).  
 
 306. See sources cited supra note 2 (describing the kind of low quality pa-
tents that have resulted from the current system).  
 307. Cotropia, Early Filing, supra note 175, at 122. 
 308. Although the patent laws encourage prompt filing, “the public interest 
is also deemed to be served by allowing an inventor time to perfect his inven-
tion.” TP Labs., Inc. v. Prof’l Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 968 (Fed. Cir. 
1984). So, while public use of the invention more than one year prior to filing 
can bar issuance of a patent under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), a judicially created doc-
trine known as the experimental use exception can negate the bar by affording 
the inventor time to improve and perfect the invention. See City of Elizabeth v. 
Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 134–37 (1877) (articulating the ex-
perimental use doctrine); Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 
1336, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (listing objective criteria for determining if a use is 
experimental). 
 309. Further development and refinement of the invention “produce a bet-
ter invention—whether it be safer, cheaper, more efficient, more durable, or 
more effective.” Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 172, at 654. When 
the refined embodiments are described and claimed, “the patentee can better 
protect the embodiment being marketed since it is that embodiment which 
competitors will likely target” and perhaps try to design around. Id. Further, 
forcing competitors to design around an invention lies at the heart of competi-
tion and ultimately benefits the consumer when competitors produce better 
and cheaper products. State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 
1235–36 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 310. For example, if the invention is actually reduced to practice at the 
time of filing, it is much easier for the examiner to gauge compliance with the 
enablement requirement. See Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 172, at 
653 (arguing that working examples provide the best evidence “be-
cause . . . nothing is left to speculation or doubt.”). Relatedly, the applicant’s 
ability to provide more technical information about the invention allows for a 
more robust examination and mitigates the examiner’s information deficit. See 
discussion supra Part I.C.1. 
 311. That delayed filing allows the applicant to generate more technical 
information about the invention and allows for a more robust examination 
which translates into improved patent quality. See supra notes 282–83 and 
accompanying text. 
 312. As Professor Christopher Cotropia explains: 
  Additional technical information and definition reduce the uncer-
tainty surrounding the invention before examination begins. The in-
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Any discussion of delayed filing can be contentious given 
the oft-touted benefits of early filing in patent law.314 Debates 
over the timing issue will certainly continue as the recent pas-
sage of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA)315 will con-
vert the United States from a first-to-invent to a first-inventor-
to-file patent system.316
 
ventor gains a better handle on whether the invention provides the 
wanted results. Furthermore, the additional time that passes while 
[development] is occurring produces more information of its own. This 
all places the actual examination forward in time, giving the inventor 
more certainty as to the invention’s ultimate commercial worth. 
 Under the proposed regime, an appli-
cant might face a tradeoff between more pre-filing work and 
diligence (in part to adduce sufficient proof to prove patentabil-
Cotropia, Early Filing, supra note 175, at 123 (citing Michael Abramowicz, 
The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1065, 
1075–76 (2007)). 
 313. “The resulting patent, by disclosing the post-conception refinements to 
the invention, will ‘provide[] the public a readily available teaching of the most 
practicable device.’” Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 172, at 654 (quot-
ing Brief of Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law Association in 
Support of Petitioner at 9, Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998) (No. 
97-1130)). 
 314. See Transco Prods. Inc. v. Performance Contracting, Inc., 38 F.3d 551, 
558 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (rejecting an interpretation of § 112 which would “subvert 
the patent system’s goal of promoting the useful arts through encouraging ear-
ly disclosure”); W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. 
Cir. 1983) (“Early public disclosure is a linchpin of the patent system.”). Com-
pare John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 439, 445 (2004) (arguing that early filing leads to reduced patent terms, 
thereby dedicating the invention to the public at an earlier time), and Kitch, 
Nature and Function, supra note 187, at 269–80 (arguing that early filing fa-
cilitates commercialization, coordinates the development of technology, and 
reduces wasteful duplicative efforts by competitors), with Seymore, Teaching 
Function, supra note 172, at 659–61 (arguing that ex ante incentives which 
encourage early filing can thwart innovation), and Cotropia, Early Filing, su-
pra note 175, at 88–119 (discussing the costs of early filing). 
 315. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 
284 (2011) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
 316. See id. § 3, 125 Stat. at 285–87 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) and re-
pealing 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)). The difference matters when two or more parties 
independently develop the same or similar invention around the same time. 
Under the first-to-invent system, “the patent will be awarded to the applicant 
who was the first inventor in fact . . . even if the first inventor was not the first 
person to file a patent application directed towards that invention.” Schacht & 
Thomas, supra note 281, at 10. Under the first-inventor-to-file system, “the 
inventor who first filed an application at the patent office is presumptively en-
titled to the patent,” thereby making the question of “[w]hether or not the first 
applicant was actually the first individual to complete the invention in the 
field . . . irrelevant.” Id. at 10–11. 
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ity) and the perceived need to race to the Patent Office with the 
underdeveloped invention (and hope for the best).317
While it is certainly true that the AIA redefines prior art,
  
318 
it is far from clear how the first-inventor-to-file system will af-
fect filing behavior. To illustrate, consider the general rule un-
der the AIA that any disclosure by a third party before the in-
ventor’s filing date will ordinarily defeat patentability.319 
However, a third-party disclosure will not qualify as prior art if 
within one year of filing either the inventor had already dis-
closed the invention before the third party320 or the third party 
somehow derived its disclosure from the inventor.321 Surveying 
this new landscape, Professors Dennis Crouch and Jason 
Rantanen suggest that inventors will have two low-cost options 
to secure an early filing date.322 One is to file a provisional pat-
ent application—an option available under existing law.323
 
 317. To the extent that the first-inventor-to-file regime forces inventors to 
race to the Patent Office, this “would encourage premature and sketchy tech-
nological disclosures in hastily-filed patent applications.” Schacht & Thomas, 
supra note 
 The 
281, at 11 (citing Coe A. Bloomberg, In Defense of the First-to-
Invent Rule, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 255, 260 (1993)). 
 318. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3, 125 Stat. at 285–86 
(amending 35 U.S.C. § 102); Robert A. Armitage, Understanding the America 
Invents Act and Its Implications for Patenting, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 22–87 (2012) 
(discussing the AIA’s prior art provisions). The changes will apply to patent 
applications with an effective filing date after March 16, 2013. See id. § 3, 125 
Stat. at 288. 
 319. Id. § 3, 125 Stat. at 285–87 (to be codified as 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)). By 
contrast, under the current regime, a one-year grace period applies to disclo-
sures made by the inventor or third parties before filing. See 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102(b) (2006).  
 320. America Invents Act § 3, 125 Stat. at 286 (to be codified as 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102(b)(1)(B)). 
 321. Id. (to be codified as 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1)(A)). 
 322. See Dennis Crouch, Disclosure under the AIA: Introducing The Poor 
Man’s Provisional Patent Application, PATENTLY-O (Sep. 21, 2011, 6:16 PM), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/09/disclosure-under-the-aia-the-poor 
-mans-provisional-patent-application.html [hereinafter Crouch, Disclosure 
Under the AIA]; Jason Rantanen, The Effects of the America Invents Act on 
Technological Disclosure, PATENTLY-O (Sept. 8, 2011, 3:01 PM), http://www 
.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/09/the-effects-of-the-america-invents-act-on 
-technological-disclosure.html. 
 323. A provisional patent application (PPA) allows an inventor to obtain an 
early filing date for the invention before the inventor is ready to draft a claim 
or a full application. See 35 U.S.C. § 111 (2006). A PPA is not examined and 
only requires a minimal filing fee. Id. The inventor must, however, submit a 
regular, “nonprovisional” application within one year, or the PPA is automati-
cally abandoned. 35 U.S.C. § 119(e)(1). In short, the PPA provides an inventor 
with an easy and inexpensive mode of entry into the U.S. patent system. 
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other is to simply make an early, pre-filing disclosure.324 The ul-
timate choice of whether or when to file or disclose will depend 
on the inventor’s overall patenting strategy.325
  CONCLUSION   
  
It is far too easy to get a (bad) patent. Despite administra-
tive, legislative, and judicial efforts at patent reform, it is still 
the case that anyone who files a patent application on anything 
will eventually get a patent. This is because the presumption of 
patentability and allocations of burdens of proof put applicants 
in a favorable position from the very outset of patent examina-
tion. As this Article has shown, many of the pressing problems 
in the patent system can be traced to this paradigm. The situa-
tion is much different under the proposed regime which re-
balances the scales of patentability. By placing a heavier bur-
den upon the applicant, getting a patent would be far from 
guaranteed. This would cure many ills of the patent system and 
promote broader goals of patent policy. 
 
 
 324. Professor Crouch has explained the benefits of this option: 
  Self-disclosure offers similar benefits to that of a provisional ap-
plication in that it is cheap with few formalities and provides an addi-
tional year of delay. In fact, public disclosure should be cheaper and 
easier than filing a provisional application. In the same way that a 
provisional application is seen as a poor man’s patent application, I 
suggest that public disclosure will be seen as a poor man’s provisional 
application or a "really poor man’s patent application.” The disclosure 
allows an applicant to buy an additional year of delay with few capital 
expenditures and without losing patent term but instead merely shift-
ing the term forward in time. 
Crouch, Disclosure Under the AIA, supra note 322. 
 325. An important constraint on a PPA is that it must include a written 
description which satisfies the requirements of § 112. New Railhead Mfg., 
L.L.C. v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 298 F.3d 1290, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Pre-filing 
disclosure might cause problems for inventors who contemplate filing abroad. 
The one-year grace period available in the United States is not available in 
many foreign countries. See, e.g., Convention on the Grant of European Pat-
ents art. 54(2), Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 255, 272. Most of them have an ab-
solute novelty requirement such that any pre-filing disclosure, including activ-
ity by the inventor, is patent-defeating. Id. Accordingly, if foreign filing is a 
possibility, the applicant must take steps to avoid inadvertent or premature 
disclosure.  
